MAGINOT FORTS



3 CASEMATES 2&3 AND A/T DITCH. NOTE SECTION OF A/T DITCH NOT COVERED BY A/T FIRE




4. MUNITIONS ENTRANCE AND PERSONNEL ENTRANCE ON SOUTH SLOPE OF MOUNTAIN

MAGINOT FORTS



5. MINING OF TUNNELS PERMITTING SEPARATION OF ACTIVE SECTIONS FROM PASSIVE QUARTERS




6. 1 1/2 TO 2 KM. OF UNDERGROUND TUNNELS CONNECTING THE WEST AND EAST POSITIONS, WITH RAMIFICATIONS TO PERSONNEL AND AMMO. ENTRANCES ON SOUTH SLOPE OF MOUNTAIN

MIRS (b)

MP 209

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

[redacted]
By Auth. of
A. C. of S., G-2
Initials:
Date: 25 Nov 44



MIRS
War Office
London

58

250900A November 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 10

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 25 November 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The combined attack of the First French and the Seventh US Army has completely disorganized the enemy's resistance. The swift advance resulted in the anihilation of two German Divisions, the capture of more than 15,000 prisoners, including several generals and members of Nineteenth Army Headquarters, guns and considerable equipment. The present disposition of the enemy remains chaotic. With both his flanks dangerously threatened, he cannot have any hope of reestablishing the required balance West of the RHINE. Even the committment of one or two fresh major units could not materially change his situation, particularly if the weather permits constant air bombardment of the crossings.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

At the close of the period the First and Nineteenth Army Forces were generally disposed on a line: FENETRANGE (Q 4727), WEINBOURG (Q 7830). WEYERSHEIM (R 0412), STRASBOURG (W 0298), MOLSHEIM (V 8193), BAREMBACH (V 6286), NATZVILLER (V 6481), FRAIZE (V 4554), E of GERARDMER (V 4440), LE MENIL (K 3232), ROUGEMONT (V 4204), BELFORT (A 3494), TRETUDANS (A 3486), ROMAGNY (A 5090), LARGITZEN (A 5884), BALLERSDORF (A 5691), MULHOUSE (V 6806), KLEINLANDAU (V 8404), KEMBS (A 8399), HUNINGEN (A 8888).

NOV 44

a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

(1) XIII SS Corps (O. G. F. KEPPLER)

11 Panzer Division and 17 SS PG Division, sidestepped south to meet the threat of XV Corps attack. Elements of both divisions appeared in the VIBERSVILLER (Q 4235) and TIEFFENBACH (Q 6433) area. (Left flank of XV US Corps)

130 Panzer LEHR Division. The 901 PG was identified at ERKARTSWILLER (Q 7230) in the 44 US Division zone. According to PW statement, the remaining elements of the division were to be committed in the same sector.

(2) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen d. Inf. von GILSA)

According to PW statement General GILSA left the corps on 21 November. The Chief of Staff was captured on 22 November and the corps lost control of the operation.

361 Volksgrenadier Division. All three regiments (951, 933, and 952 Volksgrenadier Regiments) were committed in the 44 US Division zone, intermingled with elements of the 11 and 130 Panzer Divisions. The division was heavily committed and sustained severe losses.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf WIESE)

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen d. Inf. LASCH)

Captured enemy document indicates that 553 Infantry Division, 708 Volksgrenadier Division, 716 Infantry Division and the 16 Infantry Division are operating now under LXIV Reserve Corps.

553 Volksgrenadier Division. The division opposed the attack of the 2 French Armored and 44 US Divisions. At the end of the period the division was reduced to about 800 combat effectives. The CG, General BRUN, was captured on 22 November. During the period the enemy endeavoured to reinforce the division by committing the following units: 814 MG Battalion, 104 Replacement Battalion, 736 A A Battalion, 60 Fortress Engineer Battalion, 13th Army Assault Battalion.

708 Volksgrenadier Division is opposing the 79 US Division and portions of the 100 US Division. Heavily committed since the Allied attack, the division and attached units (201 Mountain Battalion, 812 Fortress MG Battalion, 1417 Fortress MG Battalion, 19 Punitive Battalion, 802 Mobile Battalion and the 1316 Artillery Regiment) suffered heavy losses.

716 Infantry Division. Between November 12 and 20 no elements of the division were identified. Since the attack of VI Corps, the division apparently received replacements and was reinforced by additional attached units (the 5th Cossack Regiment, 54 Engineer Battalion, elements of the X Fortress Antitank Regiment and the 454 Russian Battalion). On November 20 and 21 all units were identified in the 100, 3 and 103 US Divisions zone.

16 Infantry Division. Another division which was in process of reorganization. According to PW's of 16 Infantry Division, their unit was reorganized as a Volksgrenadier Division. Units of the division were spread on a broad front. The 1316 Artillery Regiment was identified in the 708 Division sector. The 221 GR was identified in the 103 US Division zone, the 223 GR was identified in 36 US Division zone, and the 225 was identified in the 3 DIA zone. In addition the following attached units were identified: 202 Mountain Battalion, 360 Cossack Regiment, 933 GR and 61 Fortress MG Battalions.

(2) IV GAF Corps (CG: Gen d. Flg. PETERSEN)

(3) LXXXV Corps (CG: Gen d. Inf. KNIESS)

The situation in the southern sector was somewhat confused. The First French Army reported the appearance of a new Corps Headquarters, probably the LXIII Corps (previously located in NORWAY, controlling coast defenses). The location of the LXXXV Corps is unknown. The IV GAF Corps is believed to assume responsibility for th sector opposing the French II Corps.

269 Infantry Division. Elements of the division (489 GR, elements 469 GR, 269 Recon Battalion, 269 Engineer Battalion) and the attached I, II and III Battalions of the BODENSEE, reconstituted as a regimental unit, were identified in the 3 DIA zone while the 490 GR (now destroyed) and elements of the 469 GR were identified east of BELFORT in the I French Corps zone.

59 Volksgrenadier Division was committed in the 1 DMI zone north of BELFORT. The three regiments (1212, 1213, and 1214 VGR) were identified in the sector opposing the November 25th attack of a combat team of the 5 French Armored Division.

198 Infantry Division. The division was withdrawn from its old sector (opposing the 3 DIA) and committed east of BELFORT in order to stem the attack of the I French Corps. The units attached to the division (360 Cossack Regiment, 61 Fortress MG Battalion) remained in the old sector under 16 Infantry Division.

338 Infantry Division, was virtually destroyed in the battle south and east of MONBELIARD. The 189 Volksgrenadier Division, was heavily committed east of BELFORT in the 2 DIM zone and sustained heavy losses.

30 SS Division. The 75 and 76 GR and the 30 Artillery Battalion were identified in the MULHOUSE area, thrown into the battle piece-meal. In order to meet the emergency the enemy has also reinforced this sector by committing the BG MAERKER and the 34 Replacement Battalion.

(4) General Reserve

The 30 SS Division has been committed in the southern sector in order to stem the advance of the French First Army. It is now accepted that the 19 Army Security Division does not constitute a tactical unit. Other available reserves from the V Wehrkreis, and other sources seem to be employed piece-meal on the whole Sixth US Army Group front.

c. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

Units in Contact	22,000
Divisional Reserve	7,500
Artillery Effectives	?
Gen Res W of RHINE	Committed
Possible Res from Wehrkreis V and other sources	10,000
T O T A L	39,500 - not including arty eff.
Tanks and SP Guns	155 -
Guns	Not possible to estimate on acct of general withdrawal.

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), FONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONT GENEVRE (K 4602).

a. ENEMY DISPOSITION

157 Mountain Division with attached units (888 Mountain Battalion and Ost Battalion) occupies the sector PETIT ST BERNARD (inclusive) to MONT GENEVRE (excluseve).

MONTE ROSA Division (elements) occupies the sector MONT GENEVRE (inclusive) to LARCHE PASS (exclusive)

5 Mountain Division (elements) occupies the sector LARCHE PASS to ST MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6120).

34 Infantry Division occupies the sector from ST MARTIN VESUBIE to VENTIMIGLIA on the MEDITERRANIAN Coast.

b. Bulk of forces withdrawing to foothills.

c. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (Alpine Front)

Combat Effectives	6-7,600
Artillery Effectives and Services	5-6,000
T O T A L	11-13,600

4. OPERATIONS

Dazed by our swift attack, the enemy was powerless to prevent a successful two pronged drive to the RHINE. At the close of the period, an attempt to cover his withdrawal from the VOSGES is developing. This takes the form of a holding attack north of MULHOUSE, and a reenforcing of the HAGENAU area, designed primarily to stabilize a line from the present salient East of METZ, to the RHINE, North of STRASSBURG. Should this prove successful, he might then attempt to recapture STRASSBURG.

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I Corps: Our attack through MONTBELIARD (P 8836), and HERICOURT (P 9732), reached far beyond DELLE (A 4579) before the enemy could mass enough troops to counterattack on 21/22 November. His main line of resistance then bacame the RHINE-MARNE Canal from MONTREUX (A 4593) to ALTKIRCH (A 6292). Our troops reached MULHOUSE (V 0570) while the enemy still held RHINE bridgeheads from KEMBS (A 8398) southward. By nuisance raids and infiltrations the enemy threatened our lines of communication in the vicinity of RECHESY (A 2578), as he built up his strength further north.

II Corps: The forts of BELFORT (A 3493) and the area N of LE THILLOT (A 3030) provided the major obstacles to II Corps' attack which met moderate resistance and numerous mines and demolitions.

(2) SEVENTH US ARMY

VI Corps: Only light resistance was encountered until the 21/22 November, when the enemy unsuccessfully attempted to hold prepared positions near FRAIZE (V 4554) and SOULCY. At ST DIE, he resisted strongly until our bridgehead was established. After momentarily strong stands at ST MARGUERITE (V 4364), DIJON (V 4465) and BOURG-BRUCHE (V 5673) the enemy steady withdrew interrupting our progress by vain attempts at infiltration and by use of SP fire. The enemy was soon rooted out of dug-in positions in the FORET DU RECLOS (V 3783); in spite of small arms, sniper fire and mines.

XV Corps: Once BLAMONT (V 3499) was taken, SARREBOURG (Q 5015) proved a minor obstacle, as the enemy beat a steady retreat along the PHALSBURG axis, but resisted with dug-in tanks at NIEDERHOF (Q 4604). He began an assault in the areas of ESCHWEILER (Q 2954) and EYEWEILER (Q 3056) that was growing in strength even as the period ended. Meanwhile, except for the AT ditch and strong defenses of PHALSBOURG (Q 1965), and the SAVERNE GAP, the advance of our armored elements had little opposition in its dash to take STRASBOURG intact on the 23/24 November. As the German-held West end of the STRASBOURG-KEHL bridge was being contested, the lower VOSGES yielded surrendering Germans, while an infantry-tank build-up near TIEFFENBACH (Q 3464) was being dealt with.

Alpine Front: As the winter season set in on the Alpine area, skiers, active in the PETIT ST BERNARD (C 0045) and MT CENIS (H 4455) areas broke the monotony of inactivity in the Northern zone. Scattered mortar and artillery fire was noted to the South, as explosions continued in the VENTIMIGLIA (S 8282) area. Bridges were reported demolished by the enemy across the ROYA River between VENTIMIGLIA and BEVERA (S 9282).

5. MOVEMENT

Of interest during the past week were the SHAEF report of movement of one Panzer Division and possibly an Infantry Division through FRANKFURT toward the SAAREBRUCKEN area on 18 and 19 November; the report of two trains with heavy artillery going towards KARLSRUHE from JURNBERG on 16 November; and the TAC/R report of intense rail activity on 20 November in the area KARLSRUHE (R 44), LANDAU (R 26), LUDWIGSHAVEN (R 59), and BRUSCHAL (R 65). The appearance of the 130 Panzer Division on the Army Group north flank is probably a result of the movement noted passing through FRANKFURT. The intense rail activity noted on the 20th probably was connected with the withdrawal from the SAAREBOURG and SAAREGUEMINES area; however; lack of more precise information renders a proper analysis difficult.

A French report of 21 November statedthat all the available trucks in the LORRACH region (A 9590) were sent to FREIBURG to insure the transport of troops and munitions to NEUF-BRISACH; and that 88 mm guns were being rushed there by truck from SACKINGEN (B 1684) and WHYLEN (A 9784). These movements indicate possible reinforcements to contain the break-through of the French First Army north of MULHOUSE.

The approaches of both rail bridges south of STRASBOURG have been bombed, and our advances to STRASBOURG and along the Swiss border, cut the enemy's remaining rail evacuation routes. It remains to be seen how much rolling stock has thus been trapped west of the RHINE. The damaged rail bridges might still be used to evacuate personnel, in any case. The CHALAMPE-NEUENBURG bridge (V 858128), capable of carrying motor vehicles, is now in range of First French Army artillery. The pontoon bridges across the RHINE south of STRASBOURG were all last reported as being out of action. However, bad flying weather has prevented observation since 20 November, so it is now quite possible that they are again being used.

All bridges between STRASBOURG and MANNHEIM appear to be serviceable. These include 5 permanent rail bridges (including 3 combination road and rail) and 3 pontoon bridges.

6. DEFENSES

Capture of a German Inspection Report giving the status of the defenses in the area northwest of ST AVOLD (Q 25), indicates that the enemy intends to make extensive use of MAGINOT line field defenses, and is in process of re-organizing them. However, he has not had sufficient time to complete these preparations. The following tabulation gives the status of the contemplated work as of November 23.

A/T ditches	32% completed
A/T walls & obstacles	45% "
Double apron fence	1% "
First line trenches	54% "
Second line trenches	2% "
M.G. & Mortar emplacements	30% to 100% completed
Artillery & A/T gun emplacements	30% completed
Artillery OP's	80% "

It is quite possible that similar work in the Sixth Army Group sector has been brought to approximately the same state of completion.

The MAGINOT line leaves the RHINE at DALHUNDE (R 1819), where it consists of pillboxes, wire, trenches, and shelters, built on the N and E sides of hills and forests to repulse attack from those directions. The line proceeds northward in the form of a 3 to 5 mile wide belt of pillboxes, A/T obstacles and inundation projects, passing between SOULTZ (R 1038) and WISSEMBOURG (R 1348), where it turns west following roads and valleys to BITCHE. Between SOULTZ and LEMBACH (R 0345) are located 5 of the larger type installations of the MAGINOT Line. These were built facing north and east but recent air cover shows slight activity and it is possible that the smaller guns housed in the coupolas can bring fire in any direction.

A number of the MAGINOT Line pillboxes were sited to take the N to S routes under flanking fire; it should therefore be possible for the Germans to make use of these against our approach from the south.

Eugene L Harrison
EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

1 Incl.
#1 - APPENDIX I, List of French-German Place Names.

APPENDIX # I

LIST OF FRENCH-GERMAN PLACE NAMES

FRENCH NAME	GERMAN EQUIVALENT	COORDINATE
MULHOUSE	MULHAUSEN	V 7006
CERNAY	SENNEHEIM	V 5812
GUEBWILLER	GEBWEILER	V 6124
HUNINGUE	HUNINGEN	A 8988
MASEVAUX	MASMUNSTER	V 4409
SOULTZ	SULZ	V 6221
ROUFFACH	RUFACH	V 6729
NEUF BRISACH	NEU BREISACH	V 8435
GUEMAR	GEMAR	V 7454
SELESTAT	SCHLETTSTADT	V 7962
RHINAU	RHEINAU	V 9869
STRASBOURG	STRASSBURG	W 0298
AMMERSCHWIHR	AMMERSCHWEIER	V 6647
RIQUEWIHR	REICHENWEIER	V 6752
RIBEAUVILLE	RAPPOLTSWEILER	V 6955
ST HIPPOLYTE	ST PILT	V 7259
OBERNAI	OBEREHNHEIM	V 8185
WASSELONNE	WASSELNHEIM	Q 7804
MARMOUTIER	MAURSMUNSTER	Q 7310
SAVERNE	ZABERN	Q 7216
SARREBOURG	SARRBURG	Q 5015
PHALSBOURG	PFALZBURG	Q 6519
BISCHWILLER	BISCHWEILER	R 9019
HAGUENAU	HAGENAU	R 0424
BOUXWILLER	BUSCHWEILER	Q 8125
NEUWILLER	NEUWEILER	Q 7525
FENETRANGE	FINSTINGEN	Q 4728
SAARALBE	SAARALBEN	Q 4845
INGWILLER	INGWEILER	Q 8130
SELTZ	SELZ	R 2733
LAUTERBOURG	LAUTERBURG	R 3242
FAULQUEMONT	FALKENBERG	Q 1750
PUTTELANGE	PUTTLINGEN	Q 4151
SARREGUEMINES	SAARGEMUND	Q 5157
SARRE UNION	SAARUNION	Q 5238
BITCHE	BITSCH	Q 7750
WISSENBOURG	WEISSENBURG	R 1548
DEUX PONTS	ZWEIBRUCKEN	Q 7372
SPIRE	SPEYER	R 5180

REFERENCE:
Names of towns taken from 1/250,000 Army Air Map sheets K 50, K49, K48, L50. Checked against Europe Road Map 1/200,000. Sheets 57 and 62 for French Spelling and the Ubersichtskarte 1/1,000,000, Frankreich Sheet for the German Spelling.

(Prepared by Sixth US Army Group Engineers.)

DECLASSIFIED

BLACK FOREST

VOSGES

SWITZERLAND

KARLSRUHE
FREUDENSTADT
HASLACH
OFFENBURG
WALDKIRCH
DONAU ESCHINGEN
TUTTLINGEN
STUHLINGEN
WALDSHUT
SACKLINGEN
MULLHEIM
FREIBURG
BASEL
RHINE RIVER
STRASSBURG
SELESTAT
COLMAR
MULHOUSE
GEBWEILER
GERARDMER
ST. DIE
BLAMONT
DIEUZE
BACCARAT
MOYENMOUTIER
RAMBERVILLERS
LUNEVILLE
REMIREMONT
LE THILLOT
BELFORT
MONTBELIARD
FRONT LINE AS OF NOV 25 '44
FRONT LINE OF OCT. 26

XX 361(-)
XX 130
XX 11
XX 17SS
XX 553 (-)
XX 708
XX 716
XX 16
XX 269(-)
XX 30SS
XX 198
XX 269(-)
XX 159
XX 189

LEGEND
FRONT LINE
FORTIFICATIONS
BRIDGES
DAMAGED /
KNOCKED OUT X

THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
26/2000 NOV 1944

G-2 6AG

175/ NOV. 44 / 6 AG 6012

~KEY~
ROADS — R.R. BRIDGES — HY. BRIDGES — FLOATING BRIDGES — TEMP. BRIDGES — SIEGFRIED LINE 

REPRODUCED BY ENGR. SEC.
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
NOV 44

P 187

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP [redacted]
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2 By Auth. of
APO 23, U. S. Army A. C. of S., G-2
Initials:
Date: 18 Nov 44

58

N-14822

180000 November 1944.

S20/5

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 9

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 18 NOVEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

In the face of Seventh US and First French Armies attack, the enemy's coherent defense is showing signs of deteriorating. Some divisions have reached a dangerously low level of combat effectives and are candidates for withdrawal. The arrival of one new large unit and various smaller units, as well as a reshuffle of the enemy's disposition, does not seem to meet the emergency. Therefor, further substantial reinforcements will be needed to reestablish the required balance.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Zone)

At the close of the period the First and Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line: LA GARDE (Q 2410), AVRICOURT (Q 3105), PARUX (V 4094), RAON L'ETAPE (V 3478), ST DIE (V 4165), CORCIEUX (V 3652), ROCHESSON (K 3145), LE DAVAL (V 3433), LE THILLOT (K 3029), RONCHAMP (K 3209), CHAMPEY (P 2696), HERICOURT (P 3296), MONTBELIARD (P 3587), MANDEURE (P 3681), ST DIZIER (A 4274).

a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. Von der CHEVALLERIE)

(1) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen d. Inf. Von GILSA)
361 Volksgrenadier Division, considerable regrouping took place during the period. 951 Volksgrenadier Regiment was withdrawn from the 100 US Division zone and together with 953 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified in the XII US Corps zone. The 952 Volksgrenadier Regiment, previously located in the XII US Corps zone, was identified on 16 November in 44 US Division zone.
553 Volksgrenadier Division, all three Regiments were heavily engaged in the XV US Corps zone. 1121 Volksgrenadier Regiment has been reported badly mauled, with its strength of effectives decreased to the equivalent of a company. During the period, all the organic elements of the division were identified in the sector (1553 Artillery Regiment, 1553 Engineer Battalion, 553 Fus. Battalion, 1553 A T Battalion). In addition elements of the Xth close range A T Regiment were also identified in the division sector.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. WIESE)

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps: (CG: Gen d. Inf. LASCH)
The 21 Panzer Division left the VOSGES front for the METZ area, where elements of two regiments were identified. Its sector has been taken over by the 708 Volksgrenadier Division, newly arrived from CZECHOSLOVAKIA. During the period, the 728, 748, and 760 Volksgrenadier Regiments, 708 A T Battalion, 708 Replacement Battalion, 708 Training Battalion and the 658 Artillery Regiment were identified in the XV Corps zone. Furthermore, a number of units, presumably attached to the division were also identified in the divisional sector (1417 Fortress Battalion, 602 Mobile Battalion, 14 and 19 Pen. Battalions, (probably labor battalions used for construction work) and the VOSGES JAEGER Battalion).

716 Infantry Division. It is doubtful whether the division still remains in the sector, as no identifications of its units were reported since November 12. The strength of the division is estimated at about 1200. Unless the hard pressed enemy is obliged to throw into the battle all available units, the 716th should be a candidate for refitting and reorganizing.

16 Infantry Division. The division bore the brunt of the battle around ST DIE and its units are dangerously depleted. It is estimated that its effectives reached the critical level of 600. Unless the enemy brings up considerable replacements the division cannot be considered a tactical unit capable of reestablishing a reasonable balance in one of the vital sections of the VOSGES front, additionally weakened by the transfer of elements of the 338 Infantry Division from the sector to the southermost sector of the LXXXV Corps.

(2) IV GAF (CG: Gen d. Flg. PETERSEN)

198 Infantry Division is another candidate for substantial reinforcements. Its estimated effectives (including attached units) do not exceed 1800. In addition, the division is occupying an excessively large sector, suggesting that the enemy has its forces dangerously stretched in the area North of GERARDEMER.

(3) LXXXV Corps (CG: Gen d. Inf. KNIESS)

269 Infantry Division. Since its heavy commitment South of GERARDMER previous to November 12, none of this division's units were identified in the French II Corps zone. This leaves in doubt the role of the division in the general reshuffle of the enemy's dispositions on French First Army front. Its southern neighbor, the 159 Infantry Division is to all appearances undergoing a reorganization. The identified 1211 and 1210(absorbed elements of 251 GR) Infantry Regiments are probably the newly renumbered regiments of the 159 Division. The probable Third Regiment (1209) has not yet been identified and is supposed to include the 9 GR. The 189 Infantry Division, recently renamed Volksgrenadier Division, reappeared on the 2 DIM front and took over the southern portion of the 159 Infantry Division sector. 1212 (formerly 1000 Sec. Regiment) and 1214 (formerly MENKE Regiment) Volksgrenadier Regiments were identified in the 2 DIM zone. It is probable that the 1213 Volksgrenadier Regiment, not yet identified is the former Regiment JUNGE (including HOLLENMAYER and GABRIEL).

338 Infantry Division took over the sector formerly occupied by von OPPEN Brigade. PW statements reveal that its recently renumbered Regiments (confirmed by the captured document found on Gen. OSCHMANN, CG 338 Infantry Division) were constituted by the absorption of regiment KASSERBEER and ROTH (previously of the von OPPEN Brigade) and possibly by the inclusion of elements of its old organic units. Regiment GEIGER, identified on the southernmost portion of the divisional sector, includes Battalion VOGT (composed of elements of the 91 GAF Regiment, 1433 Fortress Infantry Battalion) and the WONITZKY Battalion (composed of the LXXXV Corps Training School, and elements of MURMAN Battalion.) There are indications that the GEIGER Regiment is the former 757 GR (Major GEIGER was C. O. of a Battalion of the C V Regiment partially absorbed by 757 GR.) 758 Regiment is the former ROTH Regiment of the von OPPEN Brigade. 759 Regiment contains Battalions BOSCH AND RAEDEKER of the Regiment KASSERBEER, (von OPPEN). Considering that the 933 GR, an organic regiment of the division, was practically exterminated, it is possible that remnants will be also included in the 759 Regiment. Other organic units of 338 Infantry Division identified in the divisional sector were: 338 A T Battalion, 338 Engineer Battalion, 338 Fus. Company. In addition, units probably attached to the division were identified by document (993 GHQ Artillery Battalion and the 50 MG Battalion).

Brigade von OPPEN. Elements constituting the brigade were absorbed by the 338 Infantry Division and the 189 Volksgrenadier Division. According to reports from reliable sources, Gen von OPPENS headquarters were transfered to BELFORT, suggesting a new assignment of responsibilities.

No Change.

e. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Vosges Zone)

Units in Contact	16,000
Divisional Reserve	10,000
Artillery Effectives	14,000
Gen Res West of RHINE (including additional reserves made available from Wehrkreis V and other sources)	25,000
T O T A L	65,000
Guns	425
Tanks and S P Guns	60

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Zone)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTENEVRE (K 4602).

a. No change in enemy disposition was reported.
b. Enemy's tendency to withdraw bulk of forces to the foothills continues.
c. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Zone)

Combat Effectives	6-8,000
Artillery Effectives	3-4,000
T O T A L	9-12,000

4. OPERATIONS

The enemy seemed to be committed during the present period to a policy of withdrawal with persistent delaying action on the entire front. His utilization of good defensive terrain seems thwarted by lack of sufficient strength to make a definite stand.

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY
After strong reaction on 16/17 November at ST MARIE (P 2888) and ARCEY (P 2589), the enemy fell back steadily with moderate resistance until all the area S of MONTBELIARD (P 3688) was cleared, the LISANE River crossed, and FAYMONT (P 2099) and LOMONT (K 2100) to the West were occupied. The enemy opposed our initial attack on the North before LE THOLY (V 2643), but withdrew, resisting weakly, as he fired LE THOLY, LA BRESSE (V 3534), GERARDMER (V 3642), and ANOULD (V 4254) in his retreat.

VI Corps: From his preliminary defense on the high ground NE of REHAUPAL (V 2647) to AUMONTZEY (V 2852), the enemy gave way steadily burning the towns in his path and leaving scattered screening forces to resist in MARIEMONT (V 3450) and to delay with small arms our patrols in area V 3755-3753. Resistance from improved positions TAINTRUX (V 3961), ROUGIVELLE (V 3663), LA BOLLE (V 3964), shifted to the hill mass S of ST DIE (V 4165), as withdrawals became obvious, and ST DIE and its neighbors were burned. Continuous counterattacks and use of heavy mortar and artillery fire helped the enemy to build up and then hold the line along the RAON L'ETAPE (V 3479) NEUF MAISON (V 3485), BADONVILLER (V 3889), highway; his increased resistance of the 16/17 November had calmed down as THIAVILLE (V 3180) was entered at the end of the period.

XV Corps: Our early breakthrough of the forward defense lines at ANCERVILLER (V 3393) prompted a slight unavailing armor reaction at HALLOVILLE (V 3395); NONHIGNEY (V 3894) was held as a strong point throughout most of the period, but the enemy had fallen back to stubborn resistance before BLAMONT (V 3499) and the VESOUZE River, as we occupied BADONVILLER (V 3889) at the end of the period. The LEINTREY (Q 2603), VEHO (Q 2400) Road and World War I positions on high ground vicinity Q 2506 provided excellent defense positions until overrun, after which AVRICOURT (Q 3206) was stubbornly defended and attempts made to reconstitute the AVRICOURT-MOUSY (Q 3008) Line proved fruitless, despite reinforcements from the North.

Alpine Front: Exceptions to the usual harrassing fire and desultory patrolling characteristic of the 4 DMM front were to be found in demolition activity in the LARCHE Valley at the beginning of the period. In the FABTF zone, the enemy stirred himself and staged several company strength attacks early in the period in the area S 7096-7895, while fire fights took place 15/16 November at N 7312; vehicle movement was noted in the S 8887 and VENTIMIGLIA areas.

5. MOVEMENT

Because of extremely bad flying weather, this information is chiefly from OSS and French sources.

All empty open freight cars in the KARLSRUHE rail district were being moved towards the BELFORT area on 5 November. Possible preparation for evacuation of materiel may be indicated.

Many troops from NORWAY and DENMARK have already (13 Nov) been sent to the western front and south Germany. Three battalions of mountain troops from NORWAY passed through NEUF BRISACH and COLMAR towards MUNSTER followedthe next morning by a train carrying skis. These mountain troops have not yet been identified on our front. Another three trains of Volksgrenadiers (possibly part of 306 Volksgren Div) passed through STRASSBURG on 12 November destined for the VOSGES Front. Also reported were two trains carrying artillery (50 light and estimated 50-100 medium pieces) plus three trains of small arms ammunition which moved into our area via the bridges of KARLSRUHE, STRASSBURG, and CHALAMPE.

A large amount of traffic out of South Central Germany and Austria is carried along the Swiss border to SINGEN, thence to OFFENBURG, via VILLINGEN. The SINGEN, IMMENDINGEN line, therefore, remains of primary importance, and reports mention heavy AA and smoke generators recently arrived at SINGEN.

An increasing number of ferries along the RHINE have been reported between RHEINAU and the Swiss frontier, and are being used for the transport of heavy night traffic only. In addition, 50 barges were reported observed in the vicinity of NEUENBURG. These barges ferry troops and material across the river and can form a temporary bridge should the existing one be damaged

After a successful bombing day (18 Nov), TAC/R reports indicate that only the BRISACH floating highway bridge remains serviceable south of STRASSBURG. All other bridges south of STRASSBURG are reported out of action. (TAC/R 18 Nov and 12 Nov).

6. DEFENSES

VOSGES:

In the north our progress in the BACCARAT, BLAMONT Sector should permit us to outflank the enemy MLR running BLAMONT (V 3499) ETANG de STOCK (Q 4117), CANAL des HOUILLERES (W of SAAREBOURG, Q 5015). Following a NE direction, parallel to and east of this MLR no major organized defenses are encountered until the strongly defended position at PHALSBOURG is reached, barring the immediate approaches of the SAVERN GAP.

Information concerning VOSGES passes is derived mainly from ground sources. The SAALES Pass (V 5372), reputedly the easiest pass in the VOSGES, has been strongly fortified. The HANTZ Pass (V 5178), PRAYE Pass (V 5486) and LE DONON Pass (V 5790) all of which outflank the SAALES position, are defended by some entrenchments, mined roads,

and artillery or mortar positions, but are not as strongly organized as the SAALES Pass, due undoubtedly to the more difficult terrain. In the High VOSGES, the Germans are reported building dams across streams with the intention of blowing them up and flooding the valleys, thereby making cross-country movement difficult.

SIEGFRIED-MAGINOT:

Ground sources report that former MAGINOT defenses are being reorganized around SAAREGUEMINES by adding trenches and A/T barriers. It is likely that the enemy will alter the MAGINOT field defenses in our sector for a delaying action, but it is questionable that he will be able to use many of the concrete installations against an attack from the south.

Ground sources report a mass movement of fortifications workers from the BLACK FOREST to AUSTRIA where the Russian advance constitutes a more immediate threat. Fortifications are under construction on the heights and in the valley of the DANUBE, between VIENNA (X 49), PASSAU (Q 21) and RATISBONNE (U 15), and in the SALZBURG (Z 92), BERCHTESGADEN (Z 90) region.

Eugene L Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

(G-2 Spec Distr.)

Incl 1
Appendix #1 - December Weather Summary.

DECEMBER WEATHER SUMMARY

FOR THE

VOSGES MOUNTAINS AND UPPER RHINE VALLEY

GENERAL

In December, temperatures drop off sharply from November levels and average very close to freezing. Precipitation, though generally less in amount than in the preceding months, will occur on more than half the days. Much of this, especially in the mountains, comes as snow or freezing rain. Long periods of overcast skies are the rule. These conditions combine to produce a soil super-saturated with moisture; movement of wheeled and even tracked vehicles is distinctly limited. Furthermore, frequent low ceilings and poor visibilities will prevent the use of tactical aircraft on three out of four days. In all, December is a decidedly unfavorable month for operations in the field.

TEMPERATURE

Temperatures will average near freezing throughout the area. Altitude and distance from the sea are the controlling factors. Epinal, with an average of 33° is typical of the Vosges foothills. Ballon de Servance with 27.7° shows the effect of the High Vosges. Strasbourg and Karlsruhe with 34° indicate the ameliorating influence of the Rhine Valley. Munich with 30.7 is representative of the Bavarian Plain. These are only the averages. Cold waves, originating in the intensely cold air of Eastern Europe, may invade the area at any time in December. The absolute minimum ever registered in the vicinity was close to -15 degrees in the severe winter of 1879-1880. In an average year the lowest to be expected will be about 10 degrees. The mercury is scheduled to slip below freezing on about 20 of the 31 days.

TEMPERATURE DATA
(Degrees Fahrenheit)

	MEAN	AVERAGE DAILY MINIMUM	AVERAGE DAILY MAXIMUM
BELFORT	32.9	28.9	36.8
BALLON DE SERVANCE	27.7	----	----
RAMONCHAMP	32.2	25.0	39.4
EPINAL	32.7	28.2	37.2
MIRECOURT	33.6	----	----
LUNEVILLE	34.7	----	----
NANCY	34.0	29.7	38.3
ROTHAU	33.1	----	----
STRASBOURG	33.8	29.7	37.9
SAVERNE	33.6	29.5	37.8
MULHOUSE	35.1	----	----
COLMAR	36.0	30.9	41.0
MUNSTER	33.8	28.6	39.0
KARLSRUHE	34.0	----	----
MUNICH	30.7	----	----
BASEL	33.1	----	----

PRECIPITATION

The controlling factors in the rainfall pattern are altitude, mountain exposure, distance from the sea. Northeastern France may be divided into four rainfall belts. First, there is the High Vosges with an average altitude of 1850 feet which receives the excessive December total of 7.87 inches. Secondly, the intermediate altitudes of 1250 feet record the moderate fall of 4.52 inches. A third rain area is that of the low elevations of the Rhine Valley (500 feet), lying in the rain shadow of the Vosges Mountains and receiving a monthly total of only 1.26 inches. Lastly, the plateau area of Lorraine, with an average altitude of 650 feet, receives a monthly mean of 2.40 inches.

The same figures apply to the mountains of the Black Forest and Southern Bavaria with the amount dropping off as distance from the sea increases. Nurnberg has an average of 1.7 inches and Munich 1.8 inches.

Rainy days are frequent in December. The High Vosges will have 16-18 days with measurable rainfall. The Rhine Valley reflects the effect of the Vosges Mountain barrier and has only 12-15 rainy days.

Snow may be expected at any time during the month. Amounts are seldom heavy, and the snow cover remains for only short periods. Again altitude is the controlling factor. Rothau (1138 feet) receives an average December fall of 2.0 inches with the greatest monthly total in recent years being 8.2 inches. Measurable amounts of snow may be expected to fall on 4-5 days at Epinal and Munster and on 9-10 days at high altitudes such as Ballon de Servance. In the High Vosges, the average December snowfall is 6.6 inches, and the record fall is 23.6 inches. A tabulation of the Vosges passes usually snow blocked is available in Appendix A, Sixth Army Group Weekly Intelligence Summary dated 4 November 1944.

RAINFALL - DECEMBER
(inches)

COL de la SCHLUCHT	5.67
GERARDMER	5.00
EPINAL	3.42
MIRECOURT	2.40
ST DIE	3.26
BACCARAT	2.87
NANCY	2.64
LUNEVILLE	2.32
SELESTAT	1.42
STRASBOURG	1.65
MULHOUSE	2.24
LAC d'ALFELD	9.48
COLMAR	1.06
MUNSTER	3.70
BELFORT	3.31
ROTHAU	5.35

CLOUDINESS AND MOISTURE

The outstanding characteristic of the Vosges-Rhine winter is the excessive amount of cloud cover. The average cloudiness at Epinal is 77%, at Strasbourg 79%, and at Saverne 81%. There are no completely clear days indicated. Furthermore, at Strasbourg, there will be an average of 18 days when the sun does not break through the clouds at all

Relative humidity averages high. The prevailing flow of southwesterly winds brings large amounts of maritime air to the vicinity. Strasbourg shows an average figure of 89%, one of the highest for all France.

The Combination of excessive cloudiness and high humidity prevents any thorough drying-out of the soil. The effect of this condition on military equipment is obvious.

VISIBILITY

Visibility records are very inadequate for this region, but fog is known to be frequent at this time of year. Strasbourg experiences fog on a third of the winter mornings. It often forms at an early hour and persists in the river valleys to the noon hours. It is a distinct hindrance to aviation as most of the airfields are located in valley exposures subject to fog. At Strasbourg 22 December mornings will have less than 6 miles visibility, 16 will have less then 2½ miles, and 11 will have less than 1¼ miles.

WIND

The prevailing wind is from the south thru southwest and west. The second most frequent direction is north-east with about 20% of the observations. These introduce the dry, intensely cold air of Russia to Western Europe. Wind velocities, in general, are light with an overall average of 8 mph. Gales (over 32 mph) are seldom experienced. About one a month may occur, usually from the southwest.

WIND DIRECTION PERCENTAGES

	N	NE	E	SE	S	SW	W	NW
STRASBOURG	22.6	17.0	.7	3.4	28.8	14.5	7.6	5.4
SAVERNE	2.0	22.1	18.8	.9	3.5	26.1	25.6	1.0
MULHOUSE	12.1	7.8	.3	9.9	19.1	30.0	18.4	2.4
BELFORT	3.1	9.5	28.3	4.7	4.3	10.3	30.6	9.0
NANCY	12.2	19.8	7.9	2.6	16.5	26.6	10.3	4.1
EPINAL	5.6	18.8	5.0	1.2	14.2	41.5	13.2	.5

Source: XII Tactical Air Force

DAILY ALMANAC FOR DECEMBER

COLMAR-MULHOUSE AREA- 48°00' N - 07°30' E
(Altitude 500 feet)

Dec.	Rise	Set	Rise	Set	
1	0757	1641	1809	0917	Full Moon
2	0758	1641	1902	1019	
3	0758	1640	2002	1111	
4	0800	1640	2105	1153	
5	0801	1639	2210	1227	
6	0803	1639	2324	1255	
7	0804	1639	----	1319	Last Quarter
8	0805	1639	0017	1341	
9	0806	1638	0120	1402	
10	0807	1638	0222	1422	
11	0808	1638	0322	1444	
12	0809	1638	0430	1507	
13	0810	1638	0536	1534	
14	0811	1638	0643	1607	
15	0812	1639	0750	1646	New Moon
16	0813	1639	0853	1735	
17	0813	1639	0951	1834	
18	0814	1639	1040	1940	
19	0815	1640	1122	2053	
20	0815	1640	1157	2211	
21	0816	1640	1227	2325	
22	0816	1641	1253	----	First Quarter
23	0817	1641	1318	0031	
24	0817	1642	1344	0158	
25	0818	1643	1410	0313	
26	0818	1643	1443	0430	
27	0818	1644	1519	0546	
28	0818	1645	1602	0657	
29	0819	1646	1651	0803	Full Moon
30	0819	1647	1749	0900	
31	0819	1648	1852	0946	

CIVIL TWILIGHT (Sun 6 deg. below horizon; outdoor civilian activity ceases) subtract 33 minutes from sunrise and add 33 minutes to sunset.
NAUTICAL TWILIGHT(Sun 12 deg. below horizon; outline of objects just visible) subtract 70 min. from sunrise and add 70 min. to sunset.
ASTRONOMICAL TWILIGHT (Sun 18 deg. below horizon; synonomous with darkness or BRITISH FIRST or LAST LIGHT) add 105 min. to sunset and subtract from sunrise.

ALL TIMES "A" ARMY TIME OR 15 DEGREES EAST TIME, ONE HOUR EARLIER THAN GRENNWICH MEAN TIME.

For EPINAL - add 4 minutes to all figures.
For VITTEL - add 6 minutes to all figures.

ANNEX NO. 1 to SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 9
of 18 November 1944.



LEGEND
FRONT LINE
FORTIFICATIONS
STRONG POINT *
HEAVY ARTILLERY
RAILWAY GUN

BRIDGES
DAMAGED /
KNOCKED OUT X

175/NOV. 44/6AG. 6011.

THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
181200 A NOV 1944

~KEY~

ROADS — R.R. BRIDGES — HY. BRIDGES — FLOATING BRIDGES — TEMP. BRIDGES — SIEGFRIED LINE

REPRODUCED BY ENGR. SEC.
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ.
NOV 44

DECLASSIFIED

P 235

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

[redacted]
By Auth. of
CG Sixth A G
Initials: ____
Date: 2 Dec 44

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 11

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 2 DECEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The rapid advance of Seventh US Army and the reaching of the RHINE by the 2 French Armored Division in the STRASSBURG area on 23 November caught the enemy completely unaware, isolating the Nineteenth German Army in the VOSGES, thus dislocating the tactical cooperation between First and Nineteenth German Armies. Three Corps commanders were dismissed for their failure to deny us the access to the BELFORT and SAVERNE GAP. In addition to two annihilated divisions the enemy had to withdraw two more battered divisions, unable to provide sufficient replacements.

In the VOSGES the Nineteenth Army continued to fall back on the RHINE, offering stiff delaying action. The enemy endeavored to meet the emergencies by shifting depleted and tired units between the northern and southern VOSGES, without successfully establishing the required balance. It is noteworthy that he did not commit any new major unit in that area, probably considering such a commitment too risky in view of the hopeless tactical situation of his formations south of STRASSBURG.

In the HARDT Mountains the First German Army forced to withdraw two badly battered major units, continued to fall back on prepared positions.

In order to meet the emergency and to deny the approaches to the successive defenses of the MAGINOT and SIEGFRIED Lines, the enemy had to commit new units (four divisions).

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

At the close of the period German First and Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line: MACKWILLER (Q 3836), ZINSWILLER (Q 8935), GRIES (R 0517), LA WANTZENAU (R 0606), BOOFZHEIM (V 9670), STOTZHEIM (V 8175), RIBEAUVILLE (V 6855), CLEFCY (V 4351), LES GRANDS VIAUX (V 3836), URBES (V 4120), BURNHAUPT LE BAS (V 5503), East of MULHOUSE (V 8011), HUNINGEN (A 8888).

a. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

(1) LVIII Panzer Corps. It is presumably the LVIII Panzer Corps which controls the 130 Panzer Division and the 25 PG Division. These divisions constitute an armored mobile group capable of aggressive action within the area SARGEMINES-HAGENAU.

130 Panzer Division. 901 and 902 PGR's, 130 Panzer Regiment, 130 Panzer Recon. Battalion, 130 Panzer Artillery Regiment, 130 Panzer Engineer Battalion and 130 Panzer A T Battalion were identified at the beginning of the period in the vicinity of HAGENAU (R 0420). Since then, the division has shifted to the West and all its elements were identified in the 44 and 45 US Divisions zones (Q 5540 - Q 8435).

25 PG Division. Elements of 35 PGR, 25 Engineer Battalion and 119 PGR were identified in the 44 US Division zone (Q 6936).

(2) LXXXIX Corps. There are indications that this corps has under its command the units which are containing the advance of XV US Corps.

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245 Infantry Division arrived from HOLLAND and its first elements were identified on 29 November, west of HAGENAU (R 0420) relieving elements of the 130 Panzer Division. At the end of the period the following units were identified in the 45 US Division zone: 935 GR, 936 GR, 937 GR, 245 Artillery Regiment, 245 Fus. Battalion, 245 A T Battalion and 245 Engineer Battalion. PW's state that the division has not received replacements and that its elements are of skeleton strength (I/935 and I/937 GR's, have about 30 men per company).

256 Infantry Division arrived from HOLLAND and was first identified on 25 November. 456 GR, 476 GR, 481 GR, 256 Artillery Regiment, 256 A T Battalion, 256 Engineer Battalion and the 256 Replacement Battalion were identified east of HAGENAU in the 79 US Division zone. PW's stated that the division has received replacements since its arrival on Sixth US Army Group front, but the division is reported to be short of motor and horse transportation.

553 Volksgrenadier Division has been out of contact since 24 November and is probably reforming.

361 Volksgrenadier Division was very badly mauled and was out of contact since the beginning of the period. On 1 December elements of 951 GR were again identified as components of BG KOCH. 953 GR and the 361 Engineer Battalion were also identified, sandwiched between elements of the 130 Panzer Division.

(3) LXIV Reserve Corps. (CG: Gen lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

708 Volksgrenadier Division has been out of contact since 29 November. PW's stated that the division was withdrawing in a southeasterly direction (East of COLMAR)

198 Infantry Division was transferred at the end of the period from the I French Corps zone to the area north-east of SELESTAT (V 7862) and is now opposing the 2 French Armored Division. 326 GR, 235 Artillery Regiment, 198 Fus. Battalion and 235 Replacement Battalion were identified.After heavy engagements in the French I Corps zone, the division should be considered very weak.

716 Infantry Division is opposing the 2 French Armored Division and 103 US Division. Heavily committed, it has sustained severe losses. During the period, the division was reinforced by the 798 Georgian Battalion, 56 Fortress Engineer Battalion, 30 Fortress Engineer Battalion and 460 Replacement Battalion.

16 Volksgrenadier Division is opposing the 36 US Division. During the period the division was substantially reinforced by elements of the 280 Assault Gun Brigade, the 403 Ost Battalion, the 454 Ost (Reiter) Regiment, elements of the G/5 Regiment and elements of the 30 SS Division.

(4) IV GAF Corps. It is believed that the IV GAF Corps was withdrawn east of the RHINE to assume new responsibilities, possibly on the SIEGFRIED Line. In such case new headquarters are probably assuming responsibility for the sector opposing the II French Corps.

269 Infantry Division. Elements 489 GR, and 469 GR were identified on the 3 DIA zone, (French II Corps) next to the C/V Regiment. 490 GR was destroyed on the French I Corps zone.

(5) LXIII Corps. (CG: Gen d. Inf. JOACHIM v. TRESCKOW)

159 Volksgrenadier Division was opposing the right flank of the French II Corps offering stiff resistance to our advance.

159 Volksgrenadier Division has not been identified by contact since 19 November. However, the French I Corps reports the location of divisional headquarters at VIEUX THANN (V 5212) indicating that elements of the division remain in that area. The division was very heavily committed and the French First Army states that it is partially destroyed.

30 SS Division. Elements (77 GR and 30 Recon. Battalion) were recently identified east of COLMAR in the French I Corps zone. The remainder of the division was identified on 2 December in the VI US Corps zone (75 GR merged with 76 GR).

(6) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Front)

Units in Contact	25,000
Artillery Effectives	?
Gen Res W of RHINE	Committed
Possible Res from Wehrkreis V and other sources	7-10,000
T O T A L	32-35,000 - not including artillery.
Tanks and S P Guns	140
Guns	Not possible to estimate on account of general withdrawal.

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1583), BOURG - S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONT GENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

157 Mountain Division. There are indications that the division might be withdrawn, and that the sector will be taken over by Italian units and the 5 Mountain Division.

MONTE ROSA Division (elements) occupies the sector MONT GENEVRE -LARCHE PASS.

5 Mountain Division (elements) occupies the sector LARCHE PASS-ST MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6120). III/100 Mountain Regiment was identified on 26 November in the valley of MONT CENIS indicating that elements of the division are located in the 157 Mountain Division sector.

34 Infantry Division occupies the sector ST MARTIN VESUBIE-VENTIMIGLIA.

b. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

Combat Effectives	6-7,000
Artillery Effectives and Services	5-6,000
T O T A L	11-13,000

4. OPERATIONS

Enemy forces south of STRASSBURG continue an orderly retreat back to the RHINE crossings, in particular the bridge at NEUF BRISACH. In the North, he is resisting fiercely and using armored counterattacks in an effort to deny us the approaches to the MAGINOT and SIEGFRIED Lines as long as possible.

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(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I Corps: Stiff and determined resistance was made to our drive to clean out the remaining pocket in the southern VOSGES. The enemy began to make extensive use of SP guns as support for counterattacks on GALFINGUE (V 6202) and LUTTERBACH (V 6607), which continued throughout the period. He unsuccessfully attempted to dislodge our bridgehead at V 6606 and destroy our position along the DOLLER River from PONT D'ASPACH (V 5705) to the S edge of LUTTERBACH. Enemy pressure continued strong N of MULHOUSE (V 7006).

II Corps: Enemy withdrawals took place at the beginning of the period until good defensive terrain was reached at the Passes of BUSSANG (V 3520) and of ODERON (V 3521). Here, and at the towns of MASEVAUX (V 4408) and LANW. (V 4606), he resisted stubbornly, counterattacking with infantry supported by tanks or SP guns. After the fall of MASEVAUX and LANW, heavy artillery fire in the towns and counterattacks at BOURBACH (V 4711) showed his determination to delay our advance, as he retook several terrain features. Enemy withdrawals took place S of GERARDMER (V 3642) at the end of the period.

(2) SEVENTH ARMY

VI Corps: In the VOSGES area from N of GERARDMER (V 3642) to the RHINE Plain, the enemy resisted fiercely, wherever tenable terrain could be utilized for dug-in positions. MUTZIG (V 7993) was cleared on the 26/27 November, except one of its forts which was still resisting at the end of the period. As reinforcements bolstered his forces, the enemy attempted strong counterattacks supported by tanks. Near the period's end, defended road blocks were opposing our advance on all routes to the RHINE Valley, with strongest resistance met at ITTERSWILLER (V 7774). Reinforcements were observed arriving in the area of SELESTATT (V 7962). Resistance to our drive S and SE down the RHINE Valley was moderate, except in the vicinity of ERSTEIN (V 9480). Elsewhere in this zone our advance was delayed by blown bridges, mines, and flooding. By 1 December BOOFZHEIM (V 9670) and BENFIELD (V 8974) had been taken after slight resistance.

In STRASSBURG, all forts on the outskirts of the city were taken while the enemy still defended the East end of the KEHL Bridge as his reinforcements arrived. About 30 November, the enemy unsuccessfully attempted to cross the river in rubber boats and launches. At the period's end, heavy caliber artillery fire fell on STRASSBURG and its power plant, while the KEHL Bridges were blown by the Germans. NE of the city, our reconnaissance elements contacted small groups of enemy in KILSTETT (R 0909) and GAMBSHEIM (R 1110).

XV Corps: On the front extending from the RHINE to the area of BERG (Q 5833), the enemy fiercely resisted all our attempts to advance toward HAGENAU (R 0425) and through the HARDT Mountain passes. His resistance took the form of heavy counterattacks as tanks were thrown in and infantry reinforcements arrived continuously in the rear areas. His defense centered about the W end of the TIEFFENBACH - INGWILLER Pass, while all vital road nets were protected by strong road blocks, and defensive terrain was held from dug-in positions and by emplaced tanks. TIEFFENBACH (Q 6434) was cleared after heavy resistance, on the 29th, as was the town of INGWILLER (Q 8130). At the end of the period, the enemy was stubbornly holding WINGEN (Q 7336), WIMMENAU (Q 7635) and the area N of TIEFFENBACH from entrenched positions, while resisting strongly in the HAGENAU area.

Alpine Sector: On the Alpine front, an increase in enemy artillery and mortar fire were noted in the S sector on 29 November.

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SECRET

Unfavorable weather limited observation of enemy movements during the period. The few observations that were made showed that he was building up supplies and material in the BLACK FOREST area. The principal lines being used were the DONAUESCHINGEN-FREIBURG line and the DONAUESCHINGEN-OFFENBURG line. On 27 November, following the bomber attack on OFFENBURG, 24 locomotives were damaged on the DONAUESCHINGEN -OFFENBURG line by F/B's. Since these locomotives had no attached cars, it is quite probable that they had been dispersed along the line to prevent large scale loss in the event of a bombing attack. Box cars have also been seen in groups of 20-30 at various marshalling yards along the same route, but further observations are necessary to determine whether these are unloading points or dispersal areas.

Moderate to heavy rail activity continued in the area KARLSRUHE-PFORZHEIM-SPEYER (R 5180)-LANDAU (R 2866). Movement south of KARLSRUHE appeared headed toward RASTATT (R 3429) which seems to be of increasing importance as a supply depot. WEISSENBURG (R 1548) has also seen a good bit of rail activity and may be an intermediate point in the supply system of the enemy forces.

Preparation for evacuation of the German forces west of the RHINE is indicated by the 200 barges observed along the RHINE south of STRASSBURG, the pontoon assembly points reported by OSS on the RHINE east of MULHOUSE, between NEUENBURG and VIEUX-BIRSACH, and in the vicinity of the MARKOLSHEIM-SASBACH pontoon bridge site (V 95). This material might be used either for ferrying purposes or for the construction of bridges to be used after dark.

Of interest is the route taken by the 256 Volksgrenadier Division enroute from HOLLAND to HAGENAU (R 02). A PW reported he passed through MAINZ (M 35)-DARMSTADT (M 64)-KARLSRUHE to RASTATT (R 33) thence across the RHINE to HAGENAU. Movements were made only at night.

With the destruction of the three bridges across the RHINE at STRASSBURG on 2 December, the only crossings still available to the Germans south of MANNHEIM are as follows:

SPEYER RR & Rd - (R 525800). Damaged 1 December.
GERMERSHEIM Floating Highway - (R 472693).
GERMERSHEIM RR - (R 472690).
KARLSRUHE RR & Rd - (R 415485).
SELTZ Ferry-Pontoon Rd - (R 293321).
WINTERSDORF RR - (R 277277).
NEUF BRISACH RR - (V 885359), now serviceable.
NEUENBURG RR - (V 858128), damaged 1 December.


6. SUPPLIES

A document captured from Brigade VON OPPEN, formerly in the BELFORT area, provides further evidence of extreme shortage of optical equipment available to the enemy. The order dated 23 October requires all optical sights to be salvaged at any cost whenever a weapon is abandoned. This applies particularly to captures Allied guns which were claimed to be used in great numbers to bolster German gun positions. Upon destruction of such guns, after expenditure of available ammunition the optical apparatus therefrom must likewise be recovered for conversion to permit future utilization on German guns. Brigade VON OPPEN appears to have forwarded such items directly to the Central Ordnance Office in BERLIN.

A French report claims that the enemy during October conducted tests of tanks equipped with charcoal-burner engines. Training centers for armored units in Germany are believed to have used this type of fuel for some months. This report suggests that due to his strained fuel situation, the enemy may be contemplating the employment of such equipment in battle areas.

Eugene L. Harrison
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MAP #1


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G-2
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
021200 B DEC.

185/DEC 44/6AG 6714



MAP #2

SCALE 1:500.000

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MILES

185/DEC 44/6 AG 6013

KEY:

SIEGFRIED LINE

MAGINOT LINE

SECRET

G-2
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
021200 B DEC

SECRET DECLASSIFIED P164 OI

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Initials:
Date: 11 Nov 44

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 8

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 11 NOVEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

During the week, the enemy maintained a coherent defense in the face of almost continuous attack. Aided by naturally defensive terrain and bad weather, he rapidly shifted small units to threatened localities. This resulted in a confusion which may well require some new tactical unit to cover reorganization.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Zone)

At the close of the period the First and Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line: LAGARDE (Q 2410), HERBEVILLER (V 3966), ST MAURICE (V 3290), RAON L'ETAPE (V 3378), West of ST DIE (V 3966), LA HOUSSIERE (V 3455), LAVELINE (V 2754), LA FORGE (V 2641), CORNIMONT (V 3329), RAMONCHAMP (K 2830), RONCHAMP (K 2208), MIGNAVILLERS (P 2795), COLOMBIER-CHATELOT (P 2379), VILLAR LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

a. Change in the disposition of Armies and Corps:

The alignment of Corps north of ST DIE still remains somewhat obscure. The presence of an Infantry Corps (probably the LXXXIX) is accepted on the north flank of LXIV Corps. A PW of 1119 GR, 553 Infantry Division, stated that the second battalion, previous to its commitment on 8 November, was in LVIII Panzer Corps reserve. However, it is definitley accepted that both 553 Infantry Division and 361 Volksgrenadier Division are operating under an infantry corps on the First Army south flank.

The LXIV Reserve Corps responsible for the sector North and South of ST DIE has probably under its command the 716, remnants of 16 and elements of the 338 Infantry Divisions, while IV GAF Corps, which has apparently shifted North, assumes responsibility for the sector occupied by the 198 Infantry Division. LXXXV Corps order dated 15 October found on PW from 338 Infantry Division, suggests that the Corps sector now extends north to include the 269 Infantry Division. Such a shift to the North of the LXXXV Corps sector and the reported presence in BELFORT of General von OPPEN'S Headquarters may indicate further changes in the assignment of responsibilities on the enemy's southern most sector.

b. FIRST ARMY (CG: Gen d. Inf. Von der CHEVALLERIE)

(1) LXXXIX Corps:

361 Volksgrenadier Division. 953 Volksgrenadier Regiment and 952 Volksgrenadier Regiment were committed in the XII US Corps zone, while 951 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified on November 7 on the 100 US Division zone, sandwiched between elements of the 716 Infantry and 21 Panzer Divisions.

553 Infantry Division had its elements spread on a front opposing the 44 US Division and left flank of the 2 French armored Division.

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c. NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. WIESE)

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps (CG: Gen. d. Inf. LASCH)

A further shift to the South of the 21 Panzer Division confirms the presupposition that the division is temporarily under LXIV Reserve Corps. Elements of the 192 PGR and the 21 Panzer Recon Battalion were identified on November 9 in the 100 US Divisions zone, while contact with elements of the division previously identified on the XV Corps zone, was lost. The intentions of the enemy as to further use of the division remain obscure.

A PW statement on November 7 may confirm the indication that the division will be withdrawn.

The picture on the 716 Infantry Division sector remains confused. The 736 GR and 716 Fusilier Battalion were identified in 3 US Division zone with the 951 Volksgrenadier (361 Infantry Division) on its right. The 726 GR on the other hand was shifted South and remains intermingled with elements of the 338 and 16 Infantry Divisions.

Further south remnants of the 16 Infantry Division (elements of 221 GR, B G GRIMM, 225 GR) intermingled with organic and attached elements of 338 Infantry Division (757 GR, 201 and 202 Mountain Bns, 291 ZBV Bn) are operating in Battle Group formations, opposing the 3 US and portion of the 36 US Divisions zones. All these elements are presumably under 16 Infantry Division.

(2) IV GAF Corps (CG: Gen.d. Flg. PETERSEN)

198 Infantry Division. Organic elements (305 GR, 308 GR, 326 GR, 198 Fus.) and attached units (360 Cossack Regiment, 61 Fortress MG and the 39 Fortress MG Battalions) were identified in the 36 US Division zone. Due to the broad front occupied by the division, a reorganization of the sector should be expected. Such a supposition implies either the shifting of the 269 Infantry Division north or the insertion of new elements, possibly Volksgrenadier formations. French SR reports the arrival of such units on the VOSGES Front.

(3) LXXXV Corps (CG: Gen.d. Inf. KNIESS)

The 269 Infantry Division, previously supposed under the IV GAF Corps, seems to be now under LXXXV Corps (indicated by captured order). The three regiments (469 GR, 489 GR and 490 GR) were committed south of GERARDMER, stemming the attack of the French 3 DIA. It may be presumed, therefore, that this fresh division has also committed its reserves. The location of the southern boundry of the division is not known, and it is not clear who assumes responsibility for the sector occupied by the remaining elements previously attached to the 338 Infantry Division, (1034 Fortress, 40 Fortress, 1433 Fortress, 807 Fortress 808 Fortress Battalions, 404 Engineer, 746 Engineer Battalions, II and III/CV.) The 933 GR, identified on October 30 in the 16 Infantry Division sector has not been identified since, suggesting that the regiment has followed the divisional staff located in LXXXV Corps area. The reported presence of the staff of the 338 Infantry Division in VIEUX THANN (V 5212) may indicate that the divisional staff still assumes responsibility for the sector opposing portions of the French 3 DIA and DMI zones.

It also seems that the 159 Infantry Division has shifted south while von OPPEN (headquarters located in BELFORT) possibly assumes responsibility for the sector opposing I French Corps. The lack of activity and identifications on this front leaves at present no basis for clarification of the enemy disposition opposite the I French Corps zone.

d. GENERAL RESERVE

No change.

336

SECRET

e. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Vosges Zone)

Units in contact	20,000
Divisional reserve	10,000
Artillery effectives	12,000
**General reserve W of the Rhine (including additional reserves made available from Wehrkreis V and other sources)	28,000
T O T A L	70,000
Guns	410
Tanks and S. P.	60

**The withdrawal of the 405 Division East of the RHINE reduces the previously estimated figure by 4,000.

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Zone)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (~~H~~ 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. No change in enemy disposition was reported.

b. Enemy maintains in contact a screening force, while apparently regrouping the bulk of troops in prepared positions on the foothills.

c. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Alpine Zone)

In contact	6-7000
Reserves and artillery effectives	6000
T O T A L	12-13,000

4. OPERATIONS

The enemy is determined to hold the ST DIE area, while falling back to the East bank of the MEURTHE, and to new prepared positions in the Northern zone. On the remainder of the Sixth Army Group front, he continues to maintain his position, with vigorous reaction to our patrolling.

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I Corps: Enemy artillery activity continued to be sporadic, concentrated on the areas of CLAIREGOUTTE (K 2205) and FREDERIC FONTAINE (K 2304) on 8/9 November. Telephone wires were cut at VERMONDANS (P 3375) on 9 November; on the 10th an enemy munition convoy was taken under fire in the MATHAY (P 3580)-BOURGOINON (P 3578) area.

II Corps: Hills 1013 (V 3336) and 1050 (V 3444) were the scenes of the period's main action, as a see-saw battle raged for their possession. The enemy counterattacked and used infiltration tactics, but was unable to loosen our hold on Hill 1013. Comparative quiet again prevailed by the period's end, with the only disturbance coming in the form of six bombs dropped by low-flying aircraft near SAPOIS (K 2945) on November 10.

(2) SEVENTH US ARMY

VI Corps: In the Southern zone, the enemy's defence during the period centered about the LES ROUGES EAUX Valley, where the reaches of the FORET DOMANIALE DE CHAMPS (V 3460) provided vantage points for strong resistance; LA HOUSSIERE (V 3455), whose approaches had been well fortified; and the crossroads town of LAVELINE (V 2853). SP guns at strong points provided static defense abetted by local tank-supported counterattacks. Determined opposition was carried to the last ditch as the enemy resisted our entry into LE HOUSSIERE and VANEMONT (V 3658) with strong mortar, artillery and tank fire at the end of the period.

In the central zone, determined resistance at the beginning of the period was met from strong positions at HAUT JACQUES (V 3764) and Hill 616 (V 3664) on the axis of approach to ST DIE. Further North, the enemy utilized small arms and MG fire from dug-in positions and in house-to-house fighting in slowing our advance in DEYFOSSE (V 3374), LE MENIL (V 3474) and LA BOSSE (V 3373). SP, mortar and artillery fire continued to harass our troops as they entered these towns. By the end of the period, the enemy seemed to have withdrawn to new positions to the East.

To the North, THIAVILLE (V 3130) and the approaches to RAON L'ETAPE (V 3478) were stubbornly defended at the beginning of the period; the defense was bolstered on the 5/6 November by the arrival of new troops and by use of tank fire from East of the MEURTHE River. By the 9th, new enemy positions had been found in the FORET DU RECLOS (V 3883) and opposition was centering on the roads leading to RAON L'ETAPE (V 3478). Rocket fire was received in BERTRICHAMPS (V 3081). By 9/10 November lack of contact and PW statements implied that the enemy had withdrawn East of the MEURTHE River.

XV Corps: In the southern zone, harrassing arty fire began the period as concentrations fell on HERBEVILLER (V 2896), MONTIGNY (V 3191) and VACQUEVILLE (V 3287). The enemy was improving his defenses in the area V 3191, V 3290. Three ME-109's made a nuisance raid over the zone and enemy patrolsvainly attempted to cross the BLETTE River at V 2993. By the end of the period only sporadic artillery fire and light patrol activity were reported.

The enemy in the northern zone spent most of his time improving defenses including those N of the VEZOUSE River from Q 2700-V2898. Tanks and Nebelwerfers were observed in the area Q 2904; enemy troops proved to be still in position in the eastern part of the FORET DE PARROY (Q 2005). By the 10th of November forward positions seemed occupied in greater strength as contact was made on the entire front. On the 10/11 November enemy planes dropped three bombs S of MARAINVILLER (V 2099).

Alpine Front

In the 4 DMM sector scattered artillery continued to harass our zone as the enemy was reported to have set off demolitions and burned villages in the LARCHE area.

Resistance to the FABTF assault on MT GRAMMANDO (S 7893) was only light. Explosions were general and frequent throughout the period, occurring at the VAL MADONNA (N 62), in the area of N 7506; some 20-25 occurred N of VENTIMIGLIA (S 8787). Slight enemy action and scattered artillery fire were reported during the period.

5. SUPPLY

Prisoners from three Infantry divisions (553, 716 & 16 I.D.), two Armored brigades (111 and 113), as well as from 21 Panzer Division provide additional information on German methods of supply in the Northern sector of Sixth US Army Group front during the month of October. The general procedure for Infantry and Grenadier formations is to assemble Battalion and Company transport at dusk every third day for night movement under strict blackout conditions to depots or nearby railheads, returning early next morning to the battalion area. In some instances supplies were called for at regiment, but more often from division or even Army dumps. At battalion, the supplies were distributed to company trains, which frequently consist of one horse-drawn vehicle per company, for transport forward to the unit each night after dark.

The company trains did not ordinarily handle ammunition, which was delivered to the front by battalion trucks.

Infantry, in moving from one location to another, usually carried two or three days march rations and sufficient ammunition. Company trains moved separately and were set up when the unit had been established in the new position.

Fuel for armored units was brought forward by a gas and oil section of battalion supply company which distributed the supply to the companies under cover of darkness. Prisoners claimed that shortage of food and ammunition did NOT exist, and that fuel enough for requirements was regularly provided. However, there was an acute shortage of spare parts.

6. MOVEMENT

Limited observation during the week due to unfavorable weather prevents any conclusion as to trends of movement observed during the period. The few observations available showed only light and scattered movement. At STRASSBOURG, concentrations of 1500 railroad cars were noted on 6 November, and again on 8 November, but lack of observation on 7 November prevents a complete picture as to the amount of turnover. 10-12 locomotives with steam up were observed in the STRASSBOURG marshalling yards on 8 November.

The condition of the RHINE River bridges has not been reported changed during the week, with the exception of the ERSTEIN bridge (V 997765) which is now reported serviceable. A French report states that the Germans have stocked enough reserve material along the banks of the RHINE between STRASSBOURG and HUNINGEN to build 7 or 8 bridges. Some of these would be built for light vehicles and marching troops, while others could carry vehicles weighing up to 60 tons.

7. DEFENSES

Our steady advance toward his MLR has caused the German to strengthen his position by plugging the gaps in the system of continuous fire trenches all along the Sixth Army Group front. In the VOSGES, a second line of fire trenches is being excavated a few hundred yards behind the existing defenses, and 100 new pillboxes are reported under construction around PHALSBURG (Q 6519) defending the approaches to the SAVERN GAP. Bridges are destroyed or prepared for dynamiting and roads are generally mined throughout the sector. Strongpoints show an increase in heavy weapons, A T guns, and artillery.

Ground sources continue to report large-scale construction of fortifications throughout the BLACK FOREST, and in the rough country to the East (SWABIAN JURA). This would seem an indication of some lack of confidence in the SIEGFRIED Line, as well as determination to resist on German soil.


The enemy seems worried about his defenses along the Swiss border, both east and west of the RHINE. Along the BELFORT-SWISS border he is strengthening this heretofore comparatively weak section of his MLR with A/T ditches, fire trenches, mining and blocking all roads by cut trees. The enemy is not leaving any stone unturned that might hamper our movement, be it only for a very short time. East of BASLE where the RHINE follows the Swiss frontier, additional defenses are being reported cutting the valley from WALDSHUT (B 39) to STUHLINGEN (W 50) and from SINGEN (80) through TUTTLINGEN (W 83) to SIGMARINGEN (X 14).

8. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

Two saboteurs, charged with the mission of locating gasoline pipelines for future sabotage were seized by Seventh Army on 1 November. A third member of the party was caught on 10 November. Information has been received that additional agents will be sent to effect sabotage of this nature.

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

G-2 "Spec Distribution"



LEGEND
FRONT LINE
FORTIFICATIONS
STRONG POINT
PILLBOX
ARTILLERY
RAILWAY GUN

BRIDGES
DAMAGED /
KNOCKED OUT X

THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT

SECRET G-2 6AG
111200 A Nov 1944

~KEY~
ROADS — RR BRIDGES — HY. BRIDGES — FLOATING BRIDGES — TEMP. BRIDGES — SIEGFRIED LINE

170/Nov 44/6AG 6004

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC 6TH ARMY GROUP HQ NOV 44

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

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G-2
Initials: [illegible]
Date: 4 Nov
1944

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040900A November 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 7

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 4 NOVEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

It is accepted that Fifth Panzer Army has been transferred to another area of the Western Front, and that a common boundary between First and Nineteenth Army has been reestablished. The substitution of Infantry Divisions for mobile units has continued, climaxed by the appearance on the front of the 269 Infantry Division. A considerable regrouping of enemy forces was accomplished and Battle Group formations reappeared in the most threatened sector (ST DIE area), suggesting that by reason of our consecutive attacks the enemy is finding his stock pile of reserves dwindling.

2. SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Zone)

At the close of the period the First and Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line:
XURES (Q 2010), LEINTREY (Q 2603), MIGNEVILLE (V 2992), VACQUEVILLE (V 3187), THIAVILLE (V 3179), LA SALLE (V 3269), West of ST DIE (V 3966) LA HOUSSIERE (V 3455), LA CHAPELLE (V 2954), LE THOLY (V 2643), CORNIMONT (V 3329), LE THILLOT (K 3029), RONCHAMP (K 2208), MIGNAVILLERS (P 2795), LONGEVILLE-SUR-DOUBS (P 2681), VILLER LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

a. Changes in the disposition of Armies and Corps:

There are strong indications that the enemy has made considerable changes in the disposition of his higher headquarters. The XLVII Panzer Corps has not been located for some time and there is no evidence that the LVIII Panzer Corps has responsibility in the Northern Sector. It is accepted that the Fifth Panzer Army has also left the Southwestern portion of the front, probably entrusted with a new mission elsewhere.

Evidently a new Corps has taken over the XLVII Corps sector and possibly that of the LVIII Panzer Corps. Indications are that the LXXXIX Corps is the candidate. This new alignment of Corps naturally establishes a common boundary between the First and Nineteenth Armies. The location of such a boundary is still unknown.

The LXIV Reserve, the IV GAF and LXXXV Corps remain in line, although the transfer of the Headquarters LXXXV Corps from BELFORT to DIEFMATTEN (V 5300) (Northeast of BELFORT) presupposes that another headquarters, possibly on Corps level, may have been established in BELFORT, with responsibility for that fortified area.

b. FIRST ARMY

The reported location of Headquarters First Army in ST AVOLD (Q 2557) suggests that the army assumes responsibility for a sector including the area north of BLAMONT, with the 361 VOLKSGRENADIER and the 553 Infantry Divisions as the southernmost Divisions possibly under LXXXIX Corps.

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(1) (?) LXXXIX Corps:

The 361 VOLKSGRENADIER Division, converted early in September from the 596 VOLKSGRENADIER Division, arrived on the southwestern front from HOLLAND about 18 October, where it underwent additional training and organization.

The personnel of the Division consists mainly of 17-18 year olds, interspersed with older re-inducted men. It is reported that the morale of this unit is rather low.

Elements of the 952 Volks GR were identified in US XV Corps Zone on October 3, while elements of the 953 Volks GR were identified further North of US XII Corps Zone. The third regiment of the division (951 Volks GR) remains unlocated.

The 553 Infantry Division committed in early September in US XII Corps Zone, was badly mauled at the beginning of October. Since then the division received at the end of October replacements with little training. All three regiments of the division (1119, 1120, and 1121 GRs) have been identified since October 30 in US XV Corps Zone (BLAMONT area). As the regiments of the 553 and 361 Divisions are sandwiched, the delineation of the boundary between the two divisions remains obscure.

c. NINETEENTH ARMY

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps:

In view of the general regrouping of the enemy's forces, the present location of the 21 Panzer Division (BACCARAT area) presupposes that it is at least momentarily under LXIV Reserve Corps.

The 21 Panzer Division was heavily committed astride the boundary of US XV and VI Corps Zone (BACCARAT area).

The heavy losses sustained by the division in the fight around BACCARAT require replacements. PW's stated that the I Battalion of the 22 Panzer Regiment is refitting in DUNTZENHEIM (Northwest of STRASBOURG). (The 22 Panzer Regiment was identified in the 21 Panzer Division sector on October 25 and 26. It appears that the 22 Panzer Regiment is now with 21 Panzer Division substituting for the organic 5 Panzer Regiment, which has not been identified since August).

Considering, however, the enemy's general trend in withdrawing mobile units (especially from the VOSGES front) for general refitting, a possible withdrawal of the 21 Panzer Division should be considered, provided that a substitute can be found (possibly another division from NORWAY or a mountain division from the Twentieth Mountain Army).

716 Infantry Division, withdrawn from its old sector, has been interspersed between the 21 Panzer Division and elements of the 338 Infantry Division, also withdrawn from its old sector and thrown piecemeal in the battle around ST DIE. So far, the I/726 GR, I/736 GR and IV Ost Battalion 726 GR, of the 716 Infantry Division, were identified in the new sector. Both Divisions (716 and 338) were badly shaken and their combat efficiency is low.

It is difficult at this stage to picture the organization of the sector opposing US 3rd Division Zone.

Organic and some of the attached elements of the 338 Infantry Division (757 GR, II and III/933 GR, 291 and 292 zbV Battalions) are operating as BG's, supported by BG's hastily organized from remnants of the 16th Infantry Division (BG GRIMM, 201 and 202 Mountain Battalions, II/2112 PGR, 49 Fortress Battalion, 437 Replacement Battalion). In addition, BG ESCHERICH and 602 Mobile Battalion,(which absorbed 608 Mobile Battalion) were also identified in this sector.

The present situation of BG ROLLIN remains obscure. It is reported that Col. Rollin is in command of 933 GR, identified in the northern sector, while none of the other units of his BG were identified in that area.

(2) IV GAF Corps:

198 Infantry Division sedestepped south, assuming responsibility for the sector of the withdrawn 189 Infantry Division, (According to PW statement, the effectives of the Division dwindled down to 600).

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It is probable that its third regiment (308 GR) until lately operating under 338 Infantry Division, has returned to the 198 Infantry Division (identified on November 3 (V 3359). 269 Infantry Division (some elements previously attached to the 338 Infantry Division probably still remain in the sector, namely: 1039 Fortress, 40 Fortress, 1433 Fortress, 807 Fortress, 808 Fortress Battalions, 404 Engineer, 746 Engineer Battalions, II Battalions and III Battalions C/V) opposes the French 3 DIA and a portion of the French 1 DMI. In the present alignment of enemy units the 269 Infantry Division constitutes the best tactical unit on the VOSGES front. Since only four battalions, (including the Fusiliers) have been committed so far, the division has at its disposal a relatively large number of reserves (about 4000 combat effectives).

(3) LXXXV Corps:

No change in disposition. The 159 Infantry Division and the Brigade von OPPEN remain responsible for the sector opposing the center (portion of the French II Corps) and right flank (French I Corps) of the French First Army.

d. GENERAL RESERVE

It is accepted that the enemy has at his disposal west of the RHINE the following units which should be considered as General Reserve: I GAF Training Division, 19th Army Security Division, 30 SS Division and about ten Fortress Battalions.

In addition to these units, it is estimated that about 10,000 reserves would be quickly available from WEHRKREIS V and other sources. Current enemy replacements and reserves are composed mainly of poorly trained personnel with poor equipment. The units in the General Army reserve are equivalent to approximately one U. S. Infantry Division in number of combat effectives, but are very low in fire power and morale. Possibly their only role would be in defense of well-prepared positions, backing up units in the line.

e. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH ARMY GROUP (Vosges Zone)

Units in contact	20,300
Divisional Reserve	12,700
Artillery Effectives	12,000
Gen Reserve W of the RHINE (including additional reserves made available from WEHRKREIS V and other sources.)	32,000
T O T A L	77,000
Guns	410
Tanks and S. P.	60

3. SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Zone)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. No change in enemy disposition was reported.

It ap,ears that the 34th Infantry Division is withdrawing to a winter defense line running north form SAN REMO (T 0089) to TRIORA (O 0008). The enemy is, however, maintaining outposts on the present contact line.

b. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH ARMY GROUP (Alpine Zone)

In Contact	6-7000
Reserves and Artillery Effectives	6000
T O T A L	12-13,000

4. OPERATIONS

a. GENERAL

The enemy seems willing to withdraw on predetermined lines of resistance in the Northern sector, while holding fast in the central sector W and SW of ST DIE (V 4165), where he is already defending key positions in his fortified line.

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I Corps: The usual patrolling and harrassing artillery fire was punctuated by an increase in mortar and artillery fire at PONT DE ROIDE (P 3474) on 1/2 November.

II Corps: For five days the enemy peppered the sector well with artillery fire, particularly in the area of CORNIMONT (V 3329) only to be taken by surprise by the 3 DIA's attack of 3/4 November. His reaction, initially feeble, stiffened at his line of resistance, due to his being strengthened by additional troops.

(2) SEVENTH ARMY

VI Corps: During the period, resistance has centered on the key terrain W and SW of ST DIE (V 4165), with successive dug-in strong points delaying our advances on the N and S flanks, as the enemy withdrew to more tenable positions and straightened his lines. JUSSARUPT (V 2752) was occupied at the outset of the period with no opposition, while small but determined counterattacks held us off in the area V 3666. Dug-in positions NE of BIFFONTAINE V 3057 were utilized on the S flank, while an enemy withdrawal to the NE was indicated; FRAIPERTUIS V 2470 proved clear of enemy on 29/30 October. Contact was regained with our "LOST BATTALION" by 30/31 October at V 3457, however, south of that area intense opposition and counterattacks kept us off HILL 616 (V 3664) while he was successful in taking HILL 526 (V 3468). On the North ST BENOIT (V 2673) was cleared of the enemy. Strong resistance was met only in the area (V 2873). Resistance began to stiffen generally on 31 October/1 November when our troops were forced back vicinity V 3258. By 1/2 November only scattered resistance was received on the South flank, prior to the occupation of the terrain feature at V 3468. The FORET DOMANIALE continued to be resolutely held from strong points scattered along its edges, but LES FAINGES V 3569 and NOMPATELIZE V 3470 were easily taken by our troops. Later dug-in positions delayed our advance on the ST BENOIT-RAON-L'ETAPE V 3479 axis. At the end of the period the enemy had taken up a defense from strong points at the mouth of the LES ROUGES EAUX Valley. HILL 616 and HAUT JACQUES V 3564 remained firmly in enemy hands in the central sector, but LA SALLE V 3269 was cleared.

XV Corps: Aggressive patrols and widespread artillery had characterized the enemy's attitude until the 1 DB's attack on 1 November, which evidently attained a degree of surprise. Opposition was found to be strongest on the line AZERAILLES (V 2388), HABLAINVILLER (V 2591), RECLONVILLE (V 2594), BACCARAT (V 2624), VACQUEVILLE (V 3187). Infantry supported by tanks defended the areas of ST POLE (V 3390) and MONTIGNY (V 3191) after the fall of BACCARAT. By 2/3 November, a shift of units from the North to DOMEVRE (V 3196) seemed to be under way. At the end of the period enemy opposition was stiffening although LEINTREY (Q 2603) proved to be clear of the enemy.

Alpine Front: A general, though limited, withdrawal of troops in the FABTF sector was indicated by reports of explosions, bridge demolitions, PW statements, and our occupation of SOSPEL (S 7498). Artillery fire, however, continued to harrass our lines.

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5. SUPPLIES

According to an OSS report of 1 November, air attacks on gasoline plants had a serious affect on all trasport in Germany and particularly in ALSACE where very few vehicles are now gasoline operated. Due to shortage of liquid motor fuel in this area, even the Army services of supply depend on charcoal burners for fuel.

Stocking-up of small supply dumps in the BLACK FOREST appears to be progressing steadily according to reports which claim that numerous storage sites are being developed, although only a few of these have so far been located.

Indications that machinery and equipment evacuated from areas west of the RHINE and from ITALY are being used for new factories in the area of Lake CONSTANCE, and notably in the vicinity of LINDAU (C 58), coupled with increased rail activity and a recent shift of railway administrative personnel to the SINGEN-RADOLFSZELL (W 91) sector, suggest that part of German industry is being shifted from occupied zones to the comparative safety of the region just north of the SWISS frontier which as yet is largely unaffected by Allied Air effort.

6. MOVEMENT

German railways continue to feel the effects of Allied air attacks in a serious lack of rail equipment, especially locomotives. Reports also indicate that many workers refuse to drive the trains through the exposed areas, particularly those leading towards the western front.

Reports of the past week indicate that the rail line from SINGEN through IMMENDINGEN in the direction of WALDSHUT is being used for transporting troops and supplies. This line is also being used for the evacuation of factory material from the MULHOUSE area, although from WALDSHUT these "non-war" materials pass through SCHAFFHAUSSEN to SINGEN. A recent Swiss report now refers to it as the "Strategic Railroad Line".

French sources stated that heavy freight traffic from Italy to Germany uses the INNSBRUCK-LINDAU line. The freight may be more factory equipment evacuated from Italy.

Activity along the RHINE shows that the power production of the KEMBS Plant is back to 50% and the RHINE boats can again run from STRASBOURG to BASEL. It has also been reported that all RHINE traffic now moves exclusively by night. Boats are loaded in HOLLAND for STRASBOURG, the main point for traffic across the RHINE, and here they are reloaded for shipment via the RHINE-RHONE Canal. In this connection it is of interest to note that many bargemen have been transferred from the RHINE to RHINE-RHONE Canal.

While there is NO indication that these shipments are of a military nature, this waterway, although a fairly slow means of transport, represents a valuable addition to the enemy's land lines of Communication especially when his rail lines become unserviceable. TAC/R for the past week reported continued rail activity in and around MULHOUSE, BELFORT, and CERNAY (V 5812) areas.

The NEUF BRISACH and CHALAMPE railroad bridges appeared to be in use again for railroad traffic. However, since then they have both been hit by Air, and their serviceability is at present unknown. The pontoon bridge at CHALAMPE was also hit by Air on 29 October. According to a French report, the pontoon bridge at NEUF BRISACH has now been reinforced to carry 40-50 tons.

The present status of the RHINE River bridges from BASEL to KARLSRUHE is as follows:

HUNINGEN - (A 890879) - Probably again in usable condition.
CHALAMPE RR - (V 858128) - Hits on 29/10 by bombs.
CHALAMPE - (V 859132) - Hit on 29/10 by bombs.
NEUF BRISACH - (V 881363) - No report of any bombings.
NEUF BRISACH RR - (V 885359) - Hit in east end 2/11 by bombs.
SASBACH - (V 898499) - Destroyed 20/10 by bombing.
RHEINAU - (V 984681) - Destroyed 20/10 by bombing.
ERSTEIN - (V 997765) - Hit on west approach on 20/10. Probably again usable.
STRASBOURG - (W 049972)
STRASBOURG - (W C49973) - No report of any bombings. Main routes of
STRASBOURG RR - (W 048974) traffic across the RHINE.
DRUSENHEIM - (R 172173) - No report of any bombings.
BEINHEIM RR - (R 277277) - No report of any bombings.
SELTZ - (R 293321) - 2 hits east end of bridge. 2 hits on eastern approach 20/10.
KARLSRUHE ROAD & RR - (R 415485) - No report of any bombings.

Pontoon bridges reported destroyed may now have been restored. Recent reports have indicated the spotting of extra pontoons and material along the river which might be used for just such a purpose. However, no definite information has been received that damaged bridges have been replaced or repaired.

7. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

The recent capture of an enemy agent disclosed a technique with respect to sabotage which may be repeated. This agent was to penetrate our lines with a view to locating the whereabouts of gasoline supply lines and storage points. He was then to return to his base and thereafter lead a group of carefully trained and equipped saboteurs to the exact point where most effective sabotage could be committed. This group was to either penetrate the lines or be parachuted in the area where the sabotage was to take place. If detected they were to pretend they were refugees and would offer to give tactical information to the first Allied officer they contacted.

Eugene L Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

2 Incls:

Annex # 1 - Weather Statistics.

Annex # 2 - The Sixth Army Group Front.

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

WEATHER STATISTICS

I. GENERAL

The appended statistics give pertinent weather data in the area south of MANNHEIM. It will be noted that rainfall is generally high, flying conditions are bad, and by November, the cloudy skies and unsettled weather of early winter prevail.

II. THE VOSGES MOUNTAINS. (See Appendices A and B).

1. Temperature

Winter weather prevails in the area during the months of November through March at altitudes of 3,000 feet and above, which are generally snow covered. At lower levels, snow does not lie on the ground for long periods. In the northern sector, where the mountains are lower, mild unsettled weather alternates with cold spells. Valleys generally have low night temperatures, causing fog which persists until late morning.

2. Precipitation

Although October is the wettest month of the year, the worst storms occur in late December and January. During November, skies are overcast a majority of the time.

3. Influence on Movement (See Appendix A).

Roads over the summits of mountains are liable to be blocked intermittently. Passes over 4,000 feet altitude are blocked for a period of four months or more. The Route des Cretes is completely snow-blocked for about five months.

III. THE BELFORT GAP (See Appendix C).

1. Temperature

The temperature varies as follows:

a. Cold snaps generally follow rain.
b. At the geginning of November, the first cold weather begins to appear. (About 32 degrees F).
c. The first serious frosts are noted toward the end of November.
d. The real cold period begins in Mid-December. (Oftentimes a mild spell between Christman and the first of January).
e. Streams are not sufficiently frozen to permit skating before Christmas, as a general rule.

2. Precipitation

Autum is the driest season of the year. The heavy rains and snow storms begin about the middle of December.

3. Influence on Movement

a. In general, the ground does not become soggy until December.

b. In the Gap itself, there are no dangerously icy conditions of roads before the middle of December.

IV. THE RHINE VALLEY (See Appendix D)

1. Temperature

Temperatures in November average just below 40 degrees, but these temperatures combine with high humidity to cause discomfort. January is the coldest month.

2. Visibility

Skies are overcast a majority of winter days in most of this sector with a minimum of overcast days in the Karlsruhe-Mannheim sector and a maximum over the Belfort-Freibourg-Strasbourg area.

3. Influence on Movement

Except for long periods of freezing, winter is the season of unfavorable movement on unimproved roads. Roads east of the Rhine are less favorable to traffic than on the west. The spring thaw is more unfavorable to movement then fall rains.

V. THE BLACK FOREST

1. Temperature

This area is characterized by temperatures of 11 to 35 degrees F, and by precipitation in the form of snow. There may be long periods of low lying clouds. The concentration of wind within narrow valleys produces local winds of great violence which are an important element in the local climate. The annual temperature range increases towards the south. (Freiburg, 34 degrees F.) The rise in temperature is slow in this region. 120 days with frost during a year is average; the first frost coming by the 15th of October for the outer fringes and the 1st of October for the central region. The last frost will come between the 21st of April and the 5th of May for the outer fringe and after the 19th of May in the central region.

2. Precipitation

The average rainfall in this region is 33 inches a year and in some areas of the forest as high as 55 inches. The outer fringes receive from 31 to 47 inches and the higher central region well over 47. The minimum rainfall for this region comes during the winter months of November, December, and January. The winter rains often occur as light showers or drizzles. Thus, although December is often the dryest month of the year, it may have a greater number of rainy days than any other month. At higher altitudes, snow is the more predominate form of precipitation. January is the month with the most snow days with February and March being very little behind. Snow may fall as early as October, but rarely below altitudes of 1,500 feet. In November, snow begins to be fairly frequent. By December, winter conditions have set in and snow is as frequent as rain. On the outer fringes, the average is from 30 to 50 days of snowfall for the season. In the higher central region the average is over 50 days.

3. Visibility

The winter is the cloudiest season of the year. The clouds are low and mountain regions are often above cloud level. Up to levels of 3,000 feet, hilly and mountainous regions have a notably high cloud amount. (Eight-tenths of the time in winter). Because of this winter cloud maximum combined with the shortness of daylight, sunshine hours in January average only one to two hours per day. Fog is nearly always land fog. At high mountain stations, mists and fog are really clouds and the frequency of occurence is very high.

APPENDIX "A"

THE VOSGES PASSES

PASS	HEIGHT BLOCKED (FEET)	ROUTE
BONHOMME (V 5151)	3144 Intermittent Dec to Mar	ST DIE (V 4265)-COLMAR (V 7142)
ROUTES DES CRETES	2950 Nov to late May 4450	BONHOMME PASS (V 5151) SCHLUCHT PASS (V 4841) CERNAY (V 5820)
SCHLUCHT (V 4841)	3737 Late Nov to May	GERARDMER (V 3642)-COLMAR (V 7142)
BRAMONT (V 4233)	3173 Intermittent Dec to Feb	GERARDMER (V 3642)-THANN (V 5212)
BALLON DE ALSACE	3685 Late Nov to Early April	BELFORT (V 3493)-GERARDMER (V 3642)
ROUTE JOFFRE	2428 Dec to March	MASEVAUX (V 4508)-THANN (V 5212)

APPENDIX "B"

RAINFALL IN VOSGES MOUNTAINS
Based on 50 year observation
Given in mm.

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Col de Bussang	161	139	150	141	114	136
Ballon de Servance	193	166	203	163	126	165
Le Thillot	189	173	204	172	143	164
Ramonchamp	180	160	182	171	141	148
Remauvillers	178	160	186	166	136	151
La Bresse	173	152	162	148	128	143
Cornimont	186	166	193	169	137	157
Cornimont (Travexin)	194	174	202	177	143	164
Saulxures-sur-Moselotte	180	157	174	161	127	141
Basse-sur-le-Rupt	164	143	155	143	115	126
Trougemont (Basse-s.-Rupt)	159	139	149	139	111	122
Les Truches (Rochesson)	170	147	149	136	111	127
Saint-Ame	148	128	129	118	96	110
Vagney	132	114	115	105	86	99
Dammartin-les-Remiremont	137	115	116	107	84	96
Remiremont	136	115	119	106	86	97
Col de la Schlucht	148	133	145	137	122	130
Retournemer	192	169	178	163	142	159
Gerardmer	151	136	127	112	104	122
Granges	135	118	125	110	94	106
Bruyeres	121	106	109	90	85	95
Pouxeux	114	97	98	89	75	82
Bouzey (Sanchey)	95	78	78	64	60	63
Epinal (C.M.)	104	85	87	73	68	74
Epinal (M. Demangeon)	96	78	80	67	62	68
Thaon	89	72	71	57	56	55
Chatel-sur-Moselle	93	71	63	50	46	50
Charmes	79	65	57	49	43	49
Lerrain	104	89	93	76	65	67
Legeville	92	78	77	64	54	61
Dompaire	90	75	74	60	55	57
Mirecourt (Ec. Normale)	78	67	61	51	46	52
Mirecourt (M. Bronswick)	85	71	66	56	49	54
Brouvelieures	116	101	102	87	79	88
Rambervilliers	87	70	70	54	48	56
La Hardalle (Plainfaing)	134	111	120	119	105	114
Saulcy-sur-Meurthe	106	90	94	86	74	81
Gemaingoutte	96	76	82	72	62	70
Provencheres	110	94	101	97	84	89
Sainte-Marguerite	90	77	81	73	63	69
Saint-Die	93	82	83	74	65	71
Saint-Die (Saint-Martin)	108	92	96	87	76	83
Col du Praye	140	124	131	144	140	133
Vexaincourt	128	118	112	113	92	104
Senones	104	96	93	81	72	88
Raon-l'Etape	95	80	84	69	62	68
Lamarche	89	74	62	55	44	53
Vittel	89	75	70	58	49	58
Parey-sous-Montfort	93	79	74	62	54	61
Contrexeville	94	79	71	58	47	58
Bulgenville	80	67	65	51	43	51
Beaufremont	93	76	76	64	54	62
Chatenois	88	76	75	67	58	62
Noncourt	88	71	73	61	52	60
Neufchateau (C.M.)	92	73	74	63	52	61
Barville	103	86	87	72	62	71
Domremy-la-Pucelle	91	75	78	64	55	63
Trampot	103	95	98	83	70	75
Val-d'Ajol	155	132	143	121	99	116
Plombieres	146	127	141	134	114	124

APPENDIX "B" (CONTINUED)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Xertigny	117	97	98	82	70	79
Thielouze (Uzemain)	103	88	87	75	64	70
Melomenil (Uzemain)	102	87	86	74	63	69
Bains	91	76	74	62	52	60
Fontenoy-le-Chateau	104	84	81	67	57	62
Viomenil	105	87	84	72	62	71
Frain	99	86	80	71	60	64
Monthureux-sur-Saone	92	78	73	63	52	54
Grignoncourt	95	79	74	63	53	60
Chatillon-sur-Saone	88	75	69	59	50	63

S E C R E T

APPENDIX "C"

RAINFALL IN BELFORT GAP
Based on 50 year observation 1851-1900
Pricipitation given in mm.

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
La Chapelle-sous-Rougemont	118	100	94	83	73	85
Froide-Fontaine	140	117	107	95	85	99
Belfort (Meteor. Obs.)	107	90	84	71	63	75
Belfort (Castle)	84	60	65	55	49	58

FREQUENCY OF WIND DIRECTION
Based on 1000 days of observation
over period of 20 years.

BELFORT	N.	NE.	E.	SE.	S.	SW.	W.	NW.
October	44	90	274	32	27	84	364	85
November	40	130	291	48	32	60	315	84
December	31	95	283	47	43	103	308	90
January	44	105	326	44	34	69	310	68
February	33	89	326	57	23	94	294	84
March	27	90	288	46	24	98	333	94

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RHINE VALLEY
TEMPERATURE (50 year study 1851-1900)
(Degrees Fahrenheit)

	Average Low	Lowest on Record	Average High	Highest on Record
TRIER Alt.: 161m.				
October	31	23	68	75
November	24	8	57	68
December	16	-7	51	58
January	15	-3	50	57
February	18	-6	53	65
March	22	5	61	72
KAISERLAUTERN Alt.: 242 m.				
October	27	20	67	73
November	20	3	57	67
December	9	-11	50	57
January	7	-14	48	55
February	12	-12	53	65
March	16	1	61	71
KARLSRUHE Alt.: 122 m.				
October	30	23	69	77
November	24	10	57	68
December	13	-7	53	60
January	10	-9	51	63
February	15	-7	55	64
March	20	5	64	72
HAGUENAU Alt.: 145 m.				
October	26	14	73	83
November	20	9	60	69
December	8	-15	53	58
January	5	-17	51	63
February	11	-10	57	68
March	15	4	70	78
STRASBOURG Alt.: 145 m.				
October	31		66	
November	24		57	
December	15		59	
January	11		49	
February	16		54	
March	20		61	
ICHTRATZHEIM Alt.: 146 m.				
October	29		71	
November	21		60	
December	10		53	
January	10		54	
February	17		59	
March	22		66	

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APPENDIX "D" (Continued)

AVERAGE TEMPERATURE (50 year study 1851-1900)
(Degrees Fahrenheit)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Frankfurt-sur-Main	49	40	33	32	35	41
Darmstadt	50	40	35	33	37	41
Basel	49	40	33	32	35	41

PERCENTAGE OF FREEZING DAYS
(Figure based on 1000 days. Observation made over 20 year period. i.e. 330 days would mean 1 day in 3 freezing).

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Kaiserslautern	132	330	618	708	619	542
Karlsruhe	87	300	569	668	567	418
Ichtratzheim	115	419	666	652	611	445

TOTAL NUMBER OF VERY LOW TEMPERATURES. (Based on 1000 days)
Temperatures of 14 degrees F. and below

	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Kaiserslautern	4	51	88	42	38
Karlsruhe	1	32	64	28	13
Ichtratzheim	0	50	71	17	1

FREQUENCY OF WINDS (Based on 1000 observations)

	N.	NE.	E.	SE.	S.	SW.	W.	NW.
KAISERSLAUTERN								
October	27	86	195	62	15	161	382	72
November	15	72	265	76	15	184	314	59
December	31	71	207	61	12	190	349	79
January	31	94	230	57	13	211	294	7[illegible]
February	30	87	242	76	6	154	307	98
March	47	92	206	55	9	154	317	12[illegible]
KARLSRUHE								
October	12	337	50	68	25	479	13	16
November	14	379	76	61	19	431	7	13
December	13	320	55	59	31	497	10	15
January	8	354	74	49	49	443	7	16
February	10	354	83	44	22	457	12	18
March	19	363	54	36	15	468	21	24
MANNHEIM								
October	158	67	48	81	293	171	91	91
November	162	82	51	109	308	158	77	53
December	187	84	30	90	318	143	75	73
January	163	87	67	107	316	119	65	78
February	170	97	66	71	275	125	107	89
March	175	104	49	51	237	151	114	119
STRASBOURG (Based on 100 days)								
October	3	2	1	1	19	43	11	6

(Calm 14 days)

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APPENDIX "D" (Continued)

RAINFALL IN LOW RHINE (Based on average of 50 years. Given in mm.)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Rheinua	60	41	28	28	24	36
Pont de Kehl	66	51	43	37	33	42
Schlestadt	52	52	40	29	26	33
Melkerei	145	142	158	123	113	130
Ichtratzheim	65	47	39	34	30	43
Obernai	55	42	39	31	27	37
Saales	131	116	129	112	104	112
Rothau	114	118	136	99	98	101
Strasbourg	61	48	40	35	32	40
Strasbourg-Neudorf	59	46	39	35	31	39
Lutzelbourg	82	71	74	58	52	68
Phalsbourg	83	74	72	56	48	62
Wolfenhutte	82	72	69	65	51	65
Herrenwald	80	74	69	71	50	65
Erlenmus	83	75	72	67	51	65
Ueberach	68	60	62	46	42	53
Hagenau	70	61	61	50	40	54
Eberbach	78	68	66	56	47	62
Goersdorf	78	76	77	64	49	61
Rittershofen	82	73	71	59	46	56
Lauterbourg (Port)	64	58	55	44	37	47
Landau	61	58	64	53	41	45

RAIN FALL IN UPPER RHINE (Based on average of 50 years. Given in mm.)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Huningue	62	47	37	33	27	35
Salzlecke	68	47	38	38	30	37
Vieux-Brisach	56	37	26	23	21	28
Saint Pierre	112	85	79	70	61	82
Wolschwiller	93	69	61	54	46	58
Ferette	125	102	97	85	76	100
Roppentzwiller	86	66	62	54	47	64
Tagolsheim	91	71	68	58	48	69
Courtavon	101	74	68	58	51	69
Dannemarie	94	81	78	68	57	71
Wolfersdorf	84	73	70	60	52	64
Dornach	75	63	55	46	42	53
Mulhouse	71	58	51	47	37	47
Lac d'Alfeld	207	192	241	205	172	197
Sewen	178	168	202	159	127	156
Oberbruck	140	125	154	121	104	122
Masevaux	136	136	164	135	99	125
Sentheim	143	134	152	121	93	111
Bourbach le Bas	137	127	151	126	93	120
Oelenberg	80	65	63	57	44	57
Heimsbrunn	80	66	62	52	41	55
Wildenstein	180	179	211	175	140	180
Oderen	150	143	171	143	113	137
Wesserling	133	114	117	99	81	102
St Amarin	118	101	112	93	73	94
Weiler	122	97	107	85	64	88
Thann	109	92	104	85	71	84
Cernay	87	70	76	61	45	63
Ballon de Guebviller	182	168	224	189	174	187
Lanchen	195	187	225	191	157	183
Niedernauchen	161	155	171	136	112	147
Sengern	118	114	127	119	98	114
Guebviller	81	69	72	67	48	64

APPENDIX "D" (Continued)

RAINFALL IN UPPER RHINE (Continued)

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Logelbach	53	38	28	25	21	29
Colmar	51	36	27	24	20	28
Mittlach	158	146	180	155	128	146
Breitenbach	94	76	72	60	52	64
Munster	97	85	94	82	65	78
St Giles	61	48	45	41	32	40
Trois-Epis	72	62	61	47	39	53
Bonhomme	123	103	116	105	100	126
Hachinette	80	75	76	69	58	67
La Poutroie	93	86	86	79	67	77
Bebelnheim	69	49	44	42	31	37
Aubure	91	83	101	93	78	95
Baumschule	80	62	71	65	54	66
Ste-Marie-Aux Mines	113	102	97	83	73	86
Kleinhohe	100	92	92	91	74	87


APPENDIX "[illegible]"

RAINFALL IN RHINE AND MOSELLE VALLEYS IN GERMANY

Given in mm.
Rhine Basin

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
Fribourg-en-Brisgau	77	59	52	42	37	52
Karlsruhe	66	57	55	48	40	52
Bruchsal	59	52	49	42	38	46
Neustadt am Hardt	58	56	52	47	39	48
Spire	53	41	38	33	29	36
Durckheim am Hardt	54	43	42	36	30	40
Ludwigshafen	48	37	33	28	24	32
Mannheim	46	36	32	28	22	30
Frankenthal	49	36	31	28	23	31
Grunstadt	46	38	34	31	24	32
Worms	46	36	32	27	21	30
Monsheim	51	46	38	37	29	36
Pfeddersheim	42	36	32	30	22	32
Oppenheim	45	37	34	30	24	31
Darmstadt	66	50	54	44	38	48
Mayence	47	38	38	31	26	31
Francfort-sur-Main	57	49	50	44	33	39
Wiesbaden	58	50	51	44	32	38
Biebrich	54	44	44	38	31	36
Eltville	46	37	38	32	27	31
Hattenheim	52	43	44	36	31	35
Alzey	45	36	35	30	22	33
Nieder Saulheim	48	37	36	31	23	32
Geisenheim	48	38	39	33	29	33
Rudesheim	49	39	40	33	29	33
Kammerforst	51	42	42	35	30	34
Weissenthurm	56	49	48	40	35	40
Birkenfeld	85	80	90	79	60	64
Hochscheid	64	50	53	51	38	46
Rhaunen	60	50	53	48	36	45
Kirn	54	45	48	41	31	38
Simmern	59	50	50	45	39	45
Sobernheim	49	38	39	33	26	34
Kaiserslautern	60	58	59	53	44	51
Waldmohr	82	82	91	83	65	70
Kusel	72	69	81	63	50	55
Baumholder	67	67	77	71	50	60
Kappeln	55	54	56	47	36	48
Meisenheim	52	44	44	37	28	37
Rheinbollen	61	53	51	46	38	46
Thiergarten	73	61	59	54	44	54
Kreuznach	45	40	36	32	26	32
Wollstein	45	35	35	31	22	33
Langenlonsheim	43	37	35	31	24	31
Stromberg	54	46	47	39	32	41
Lorch	47	38	38	32	28	34
Oberwesel	52	42	43	34	30	39
Bogel	62	48	50	43	37	47
Boppard	56	49	50	44	39	49
Oberlahnstein	57	44	44	39	32	42

333



THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

G-2 6AG

041200 A. NOV. 1944.

LEGEND	
FRONT LINE ~~~	BRIDGES
FORTIFICATIONS ⊓⊓⊓⊓	DAMAGED-/
DIV. BOUNDARIES —XX—	KNOCKED OUT-X
STRONG POINTS *	DATE: NOV. 4, 1944

150/NOV. 44/6AG. 6002

~KEY~

ROADS ~ R.R. BRIDGES ++++ HY. BRIDGES ≍ FLOATING BRIDGES ≻—≺ TEMP. BRIDGES ≻----≺ SIEGFRIED LINE

REPRODUCED BY ENGR SEC. 6TH ARMY GROUP HQ NOV 44


P131 MIRS (b)

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

[redacted]
By Auth. of
A.C. of S., G-2
Initials:
Date: 28 Oct 44

61

280900 A October 1944



WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 6

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 28 OCTOBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The recent withdrawals of mobile units (15 Panzer Grenadier Division and probably 11 Panzer Division) from our Northern flank possibly indicates a decision by the enemy to transfer much of Fifth Panzer Army to more critical areas of the Western Front.

At the same time, the continued identification of new fortress and other static units points out that the enemy evidently feels his defences on the Northern flank have reached a stage of completion which enable him to pass from offensive defense to static or delaying defense.

If these suppositions are correct, it is likely that the substitution of static for mobile units will continue.

The current improvement of the enemy's situation is probably due in part to freedom from constant air attacks. This enables him to make maximum use of his most forward rail facilities for the movement of troops, as well as supplies.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Vosges Zone)

At the close of the period the Fifth Panzer and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed on a line: XURES (Q 2010), LEINTREY (Q 2603), NOSSONCOURT (V 2178), JEANMENIL (V 2271), LA BOURGONCE (V 3268), West of ST DIE (V 3966), LES ROUGES EAUX (V 3163), LA CHAPELLE (V 2954), LE THOLY (V 2643), LA BRESSE (V 3534), VENTRON (V 3527), LE THILLOT (K 3029), RONCHAMP (K 2208), MIGNAVILLERS (P 2795), LONGEVILLE - SUR - DOUBS (P 2681), VILLAR LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

a. FIFTH PANZER ARMY

(1) LVIII Panzer Corps:

No contact has been established by US XV Corps with the 11 Panzer Division since 23 October. Possibly the division will follow the 15 PG Division and will be entrusted with a new mission.

In addition to elements of the 553 Infantry Division, the 59 GR of the 19 Infantry Division (until lately spread over a wide front from South of PRUM (VIII US Corps zone) to NE of NANCY) were identified by the XV US Corps in the LVIII Panzer Corps sector.

Thus the composition of the corps is undergoing a considerable reshuffle probably in view of a possible withdrawal of the enemy to the prepared fortified position SAAREBOURG-BLAMONT-BACCARAT.

(2) XLVII Panzer Corps:

15 PG Division has not been identified since October 19. An officer PW from the 56 MG Battalion stated on Oct 20 that his unit relieved elements of 104 PGR, which with the rest of the division were withdrawn to Germany.

The 21 Panzer Division and the 16 Infantry Divisions were heavily committed in the VI US Corps zone.

The 16 Infantry Division possibly passed temporarily under Fifth Panzer Army. Such a supposition is substantiated by the fact that personnel of the division are now carrying copies of "PANZERFUNK" instead of the "WACHT". (Newspapers of the Fifth Panzer Army and Nineteenth Army respectively).

S E C R E T

Logically the 16 Infantry Division should be under XLVII Panzer Corps. However, the intention of the enemy to fall back on an organized defensive position, the decreasing number of armored units in the Fifth Panzer Army sector and a persistent build up of Infantry Divisions in that area, suggests that a major reshuffle of enemy units is taking place. Consequently the XLVII Panzer Corps may be withdrawn and replaced by an Infantry Corps, with one mobile unit (21 Panzer Division) remaining for the time being under its command, as a minumum counter-balance to our armor.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps:

Elements of the 716 Infantry Division reinforced the battered front of ~~the 16 Infantry~~ Division (716 Engineer Battalion; 716 Artillery Battalion; 736 GR).

The situation in the 198th and 189th Infantry Division sectors remains obscure. Elements of the 189 Infantry Division were last identified on 17 October. Since then elements of the 198 side-stepped South and were identified by II French Corps (326 GR) in the 189 Division sector, suggesting that the division assumed responsibility for the sector of its Southern neighbour. Possibly the 189 Infantry Division has been withdrawn due to sever losses.

(2) IV GAF Corps:

The 338 Infantry Division, heavily committed in the fighting around LE THILLOT ~~is now furnishing~~ reinforcements to the ST DIE sector. The 291 Criminal Battalion; 2 Battalions of 757 GR; the 407 Engineer Battalion and elements of the 933 GR were identified in the US 3 Division zone.

The reported arrival in the COLMAR area of the 269 Infantry Division from NORWAY, confirmed by the identification of 1 Company 469 GR on the French II Corps zone, suggests that the newly arrived division, which possibly has considerable experience in mountain warfare, may assume responsibility for a sector in the VOSGES, probably the region of the BALLON massif.

In such a case the remainder of the 338 Infantry Division may follow, its elements already committed in the ST DIE area, where the whole division may assume responsibility for a sector of the main line of resistance ST DIE-BACCARAT.

The 106 Panzer Brigade has not been identified for the last few days. There are indications that the Brigade is regrouping, possibly under the 21 Panzer Division, in the vicinity of ST DIE.

(3) LXXXV Corps:

The 159 Infantry Division with the von OPPEN Brigade and miscellaneous attached smaller units, responsible for the approaches to the BELFORT GAP, continues to oppose the French 1st DMI of the French II Corps and the French I Corps.

c. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Vosges Zone)

Units in contact	17,910
Supporting units	13,640
Artillery effectives	12,000
General Res West of RHINE	34,000
T O T A L	77,550
Guns	410
Tanks	120

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Zone)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG-S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. The sector of the FRANCO-ITALIAN Border is held by the following German and Italian forces: Coast to LARCHE Pass, 34 Infantry Division; LARCHE Pass to MT BENEVRE, elements 5 Mountain Division and elements of 90 PG Division (1/2 Battalions); MT GENEVRE, 85 Mountain Jaeger Regiment and elements of the MONTE ROSA Division; MT CENIS Pass, elements 157 Mountain Jaeger Division; PETIT ST BERNARD Pass, elements 157 Division; GRAND ST BERNARD Pass, elements 157 Division.

Recent movements in the region of the FRANCO-ITALIAN Border include the following:

Units of the 139 Mountain Regiment, previously contacted in the Alpine sector have lately been identified in the TRENTO-VERONA area. Alpine troops coming from Western ITALY are concentrating in the region of the BRENNER Pass. Many unidentified headquarters are re-locating in the LAKE COMO and LAKE GARDO regions. Troop concentrations are continually reported in MILAN, with high percentage of the units coming from the West; the bulk of the organized formations are made up of SS units, of which detachments had been used in the French border sector. Increased traffic on the reopened Autostrada from TURIN to MILAN has been noted since early October. The same type of concentration has been reported in TURIN, which appears to be the distribution point for troops passing through to the East. Traffic on the road PINEROLO-TURIN shows a preponderance of troop convoys eastward, with the main cargo toward the West being war material. The bulk of the 5 Mountain Division is reputed to be holding the passes NW of GENOA, while the First Regiment and Alpine units of the MONTE ROSA Division have been identified in the hills NE of GENOA. Units of this Division have been reported recalled from the French border due to wholesale desertion and negotiations with partisans. Only small MONTE ROSA detachments have recently been contacted in the MAIRA Valley area on the Alpine front. Large numbers of German and Fascist troops have been reported in all-out attacks to mop up the partisans in the VALD'OSSOLA, VAL SUSA and VAL PELLICHE to insure free passage on routes from the border to the East. Local withdrawals have been effected in the BARDONNECHIA basin, where defense lines have been constructed across the VAL DI SUSA and armor brought up to the area of OULX (H 34). An increase of medium caliber artillery fire in this sector and in the coastal area has been noted during the past few days.

Preparation for withdrawal may be indicated by these activities. Actual large-scale withdrawals would seem to depend upon the developments along the border, on the Southern front and in the TRIESTE-TARVISIO area.

b. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Alpine Front)

In contact	6-7000
Supporting units	6000
T O T A L	12-13000

S E C R E T

4. OPERATIONS

a. GENERAL

Despite the harmful inroads made by our attacks during the period, the enemy's reactions have been neither hasty nor unbalanced. His plan to utilize such static units as are available, to hold successive delaying lines in covering the retreat to the SIEGFRIED Line is altered only by the necessity to mass, his few reserves of wide-spread units at such points of eruption as occur in his front.

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I Corps: The light patrol activity and sporadic artillery fire characteristic of the enemy's attitude on this front were broken only by the entrance of one adventurous enemy patrol into HYEMONDANS (P 2574) and a late increase of artillery fire on forward positions E of PONT DU ROID (DOUBS River sector).

II Corps: The steady rain of artillery fire on the areas of LE HAUT DU FAING (V 3428) and CORNIMONT (V 3429) increased to a crescendo by the 25th, as it supported (with mortar fire) a nearly successful attack on RONDFAING (K 3343), on the N flank of the 3 DIA salient. Aggressive patrols probed the outskirts of the 1 DMI in the FRESSE wood (K 2614) and S of RONCHAMP (K 2308) as the period ended.

(2) SEVENTH US ARMY

VI Corps: At the outset of VI Corps' attack, the enemy seemed confident of dealing successfully with our attempt to break through his positions. His first concern was with the line running E of the BELMONT (V 2758)-BRUYERES (V 2457), railroad and for the FREMIFONTAINE (V 2364)-BROUVELIEURES (V 2560) area; the latter he defended with hand grenades and automatic weapons in close-in fighting, while counterattacking from BELMONT (V 2758) with tanks. But on the 23rd forced withdrawals had already begun E of BROUVELIEURES (V 2560) and N of DOMFAING (V 2760), accompanied by a shifting back of artillery. Despite his resistance E of FREMIFONTAINE (V 2364), the enemys' nervousness was shown by a heavy artillery reaction to our use of smoke screens and by his utilizing precious ME 109's in strafing our troops. By the 25th, the enemy had manned positions constructed earlier, and resistance stiffened generally. Close-in fighting in MORTAGNE (V 2764), BIFFONTAINE (V 3057) and LES ROUGES EAUX (V 3063) became necessary and small arms, mortar and artillery fire slowed our advance E of the MORTAGNE River. General withdrawals began to be observed N and E toward HOUSSERAS (V 2466 as we captured abandoned vehicles and equipment in our progress along the river. Resistance lessened, except in the forests on the Corps extreme N and S flanks. Another holding position had been manned by the enemy on the 26th, E and N of HOUSSERAS (V 2466); infiltration tactics began to be used from the vicinity of the NEUNE River Valley (V 3055). Reinforcements in tanks and personnel contributed to the strong determined attitude displayed about the 27/28 Oct, particularly in the area of BIFFONTAINE (V 3057). The enemy succeeded in making use of his strongly defended roadblocks in cutting off one of our battalions in the area of (V 3460). Artillery, utilized throughout much of the period in support of defensive action, assumed a greater role as 500/600 round concentrations were poured into the 3rd Division sector. By the end of the period, resistance was stubborn on the high ground vicinity V 2866, of our N flank zone and in the salient to the S, vicinity (V 3358), where counterattacks up to five in an hour were taking place. LA BOURGONCE (V 3268) was in our hands and only scattered resistance was encountered as the enemy's fortified zone was neared.

XV Corps: In the Southern sector, the enemy succeeded in retaking MENARMONT (V 1880) on 23 October. He devoted most of his efforts during the rest of the period to scattered patrolling and to harrassing artillery fire, mainly in the areas of GLONVILLE (V 2286), FONTENOY (V 2084), and BENAMENIL (V 2197).

Resisting all our attempts to probe his activity in the Northern sector, the enemy developed his dug-in positions and brought up tanks, thus being able to launch counterattacks which penetrated our lines vicinity (Q 2306). Further attempts were repulsed by 27 October and by the end of the period the zone was generally quiet, with indications that front lines were now only lightly held.

(3) ALPINE FRONT

4 French DMM: Unsuccessful small-scale enemy attacks on CONDAMINE (P 5150), CHENAILLET (P 4999), BESSANS (H 5260), and TERMIGNON (K 5040) signified an unusual curiosity on the enemy's part. Harrassing artillery covered our zone effectively during the period, with heavy concentrations falling on BRIANCON (P 3998).

FABTF: A sharp increase in artillery fire vicinity COL DE BRAUS (S 7098) preceded several small enemy attempts at infiltration SE of CASTILLON (S 7594). On the 28th of October, ten explosions were heard in the vicinity of MT BARBONNET and SOSPEL (S 7598), two explosions E of MT VETEBREN. A smoke screen was observed over the COL DE BRAUS (S 7098) tunnel.

5. SUPPLIES

a. Positions in the PIRMASENS-ZWEIBRUCKEN sector of the SIEGFRIED LINE have been stocked with French and Italian types of ammunition according to an escaped Russian PW who hauled these supplies in to the line. Ammunition was stored in about 25 barracks and 15 underground dumps having about 40 tunnels of concrete construction, all well dispersed over an area of 32 square miles. Each of these subterranean installations consists of a group of 3 or 4 separate tunnels of varying lengths up to 3 km. Several of the main tunnels of the larger dumps have narrow guage railway, and passages leading to concrete block houses in the defensive line. All are equipped with electric lighting and telephone systems. Loading platforms and entrances to the dumps are located a short distance from hard-surface highways generally 500 to 750 metres from a village. The following localities are known to have such installations:

BURGALBEN	PETERSBURG
DELLFELD	PIRMASENS (probable Branch Ord. Depot)
HOBEISCHWEILER	RODALBEN (also barrack, & large open dump)
HOELMUHLBACH	THALEISCHWEILER - (THAL-FROESCHEN)
MASSWEILER	WINDSBERG
NUENSCHWEILER	and between PETERSBERG and GERSBACH

Ammunition arrived by trains over the LANDAU-ZWEIBRUCKEN line which were unloaded daily at RODALBEN (30 cars), THALEISCHWEILER (25 cars), DELLFORD (15 cars), and also at RIESCHWEILER, while gun parts were taken to PIRMASENS-NORD.

A substantial number of barracks in this area appear to have been used for storage of ammunition, possibly to supplement the stocks in the underground dumps. Underground installations of this type, are likely to be found in other sectors of the SIEGFRIED LINE. (SOURCE - OSS Report VF 71)

b. German exports of Silesian coal destined for ITALY appear to have been continued via ST MARGRETHEN over SWISS railways. Some of this coal traffic is occasionally routed through MANNHEIM and ST LOUIS, possibly due to Allied air attacks on the rail system in Southern Germany.

c. Reports from the BELFORT-MULHOUSE sector continue to show considerable manufacturing activity although quit a number of factories have been stripped of machinery and equipment for removal to Germany.

d. The enemy is removing heating and plumbing systems as well as generators from industrial plants in the ST DIE area which will probably be used for repairs to damaged or newly constructed German installations.

e. A PW of 34 Division captured along the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier claimed that food and ammunition were sufficient, but that re-supply was irregular. Battalion and Company supply columns arrive from BREIL at night.

6. MOVEMENTS

Railroad and highway transportation difficulties coupled with the lack of repair material and a shortage of skilled labor have led the Germans to turn as much traffic as possible to the waterways for transportation. Reports received during the week show that traffic on the LEOPOLD CANAL at FREIBURG (W 0933) and on the MARNE-RHINE CANAL continues to be very heavy. Because of transport difficulties, the evacuation by rail of factory equipment from MULHOUSE has been greatly retarded. Further hampering of enemy communications is found in a French report which states that traffic has been interrupted on the HOLLENTAL line between FREIBURG and DONAUESCHINGEN.

Reports received during the past week show that considerable rail activity took place in the DONAUESCHINGEN area during the first week in October when numerous troop and supply trains passed through towards OFFENBURG.

Further activity along the RHINE is brought out by French and OSS reports stating that the bombing of the dam at KEMBS caused the river to run so low that traffic over the bridge at HUNINGEN was interrupted. In addition it has been reported that the rapid current of the river does not allow boats of medium tonnage to go further than NEUENBURG (V 8712). Boats from STRASBOURG to BASEL carry only half loads. (OSS Report).

Because of unfavorable weather TAC/R reports during the week were limited. Ground reports state considerable rail traffic still persists between ST DIE and STRASBOURG, the former being the unloading point for rails and barbed wire. More rail activity was evident along the AUGSBURG-ULM line carrying troop and supply trains toward COLMAR, STRASBOURG, and SAARBRUCKEN.

Reports on the bombing of RHINE River Bridges during the past week revealed the following:

Bridge at	(V 9050)	vic	SASBACH	- destroyed.
" "	(V 9868)	"	RHEINAU	- destroyed.
" "	(V 9976)	"	ERSTEIN	- 1 hit, west approach, 2 near misses.
" "	(R 2932)	"	SELTZ	- damaged, 2 hits east end of bridge, 2 hits east approach
" "	(A 8987)	"	HUNINGEN	- 6 near misses.

The status of the NEUF BRISACH and the CHALAMPE bridges is not definitely known at present, but a report has been received indicating that munition trains are now using these bridges, previously reported unfit for rail traffic.

7. DEFENSES

VOSGES-BELFORT:

This week has disclosed the construction of a continuous system of fire trenches and A/T ditches around PHALSBOURG (Q 6518) defending the approaches to the SAVERN GAP. Numerous machine guns are already in position.

GERMANY:

The aggregate of numerous small items obtained from S.R.F. and O.S.S. ground sources indicates that the enemy is strengthening his defenses in the KARLSRUHE-BRUCHSAL (20 km NE of KARLSRUHE) area, and generally throughout the inner BLACK FOREST Region down to the Swiss Border.

This may indicate additions to the existing defenses in the "THIRD ZONE" of the SIEGFRIED LINE which is anchored on the difficult terrain of the BLACK FOREST, or may very well be the establishment of a second continuous line of defenses based on the natural obstacles which the region proffers.

Concrete emplacements are being prepared for heavy artillery around BASEL, and, further east, a line of defenses is reported under construction beginning NE of SACKINGEN (B 1584) and running northward to TODTMOOS (W 2004). Camouflaged bunkers have been strategically distributed along the line and the main towns have been transformed into strong points. This creates a line running parallel to the SIEGFRIED LINE from the SWISS Border through the southern BLACK FOREST and indicates concern of the enemy over the status of his defenses blocking the RHINE Valley east of BASEL.

Scattered reports of defenses under construction as far east as ULM (X 68) would indicate that the enemy is preparing to fight to the end on his own soil.

8. <u>TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE</u>

PANZERFAUST 60m:

A third version of the PANZERFAUST has recently been recovered in the vicinity of RAMBERVILLERS.

The PANZERFAUST 60m is very similar to the PANZERFAUST 30m. The main difference being in the attachment of the tail to the grenade; a new type of firing mechanism; and an increased range as indicated by the sight bracket, which is from 30 meters (33 yards) to 80 meters (87 yards). The sight is marked with luminous paint.

Eugene L Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

1 Incl:

Annex #1 - The German G-2 at Work.

I THE GERMAN G-2 AT WORK

The following captured document shows how intelligence is being gathered by the G-2's in divisions opposing us today. Although the enemy's methods are similar to our own, the comments on lack of air reconnaissance and the interrogation of American PW are of interest. (Document captured by First US Army):

246 Volks Grenadier Division — Div Hq. 27/9/44
G-2 Nr 10/44 - Confidential

SUBJECT: G-2 Operations.

1. The officer in charge of keeping the enemy situation up to date at Division is the G-2. It is his duty to furnish the G-3 at all times a clear and dependable picture of the enemy situation. He has at his disposal, in addition to his clerical personnel, two officers (interpreters) as his assistants for the interrogation of PW.

2. In order to gain an intelligence picture of the enemy situation, the G-2 principally has the following sources:

a. Messages from his Lower Units.

(1) Immediate messages. Every important observation of the enemy is to be reported to Division at once. In particular the following observations:

(a) Special Surveillance by the Guards: To prevent the loss of any special observations noticed by the guards, an observation record will be kept at each post, into which all special incidents will be entered. This record will be kept in duplicate, so the guards will have a copy at all times and the Division G-2 the other copy for evaluation of the report.

(b) Reports of Enemy Rcn and Combat patrols: All actions undertaken by the enemy against our own MLR to be reported to Division at once by wire and to be followed up with a written report including overlay.

(c) Observation of Enemy Air Activity: Unusual tactics of the enemy air force, as well as every bomb dropped in our own battle sector, parachutists, including emergency jumps and all not definitely indentified flares in the air, are to be reported immediately.

(d) Conduct of the Civilian Population: The fact that the troops engaged in battle on German soil place considerable confidence in the population, constitutes a great danger for the counter-intelligence. One must always bear in mind that an increasingly growing number of enemy agents are being employed in the zone of the interior.

(2) Routine Messages. Hereto the following special orders are issued:

b. PW Statements: Now that the air superiority of the enemy in the West has practically eliminated our own air reconnaissance, the importance of PW statements play a much more decisive role then hereto fore. A skilled interrogation report is often the only source of information about the enemy that extends past the outer area of the MLR into the depth of enemy occupied territories. It is therefore always of paramount importance to take as many PW as possible and to evacuate them as fast as possible to the G-2 of Division for interrogation. The following applies in particular:

(1) The interrogation of PW takes place only at Division. Lower units are prohibited from interrogating PW, as they thereby hamper the possibility of a successful interrogation by the interpreters of Division, who have been especially trained for the job. Practically all English and American PW render good information when interrogated by skilled interpreters.

(2) The evacuation of PW to the Division Coll Pt must be carried out by the troops without delay. For security reasons PW will never be evacuated to the Division CP.

(3) Prior to the evacuation of PW to the Division Coll Pt all weapons and personal belongings, except his paybook, will be taken from the PW; for example pocketknives, all papers, money, etc. All belongings will be placed in individual bags identifying the owner, and turned over to the PW escort. This is of special importance for the evaluation of PW statements (captured documents) etc.

(4) In case of enemy wounded who cannot be evacuated, request an interpreter from G-2 of Division to be sent at once, especially if officers are among the wounded. If immediate evacuation to an aid-station is unavoidable, this will be mentioned in the request, enabling the officer to report to the proper station.

(5) It is strictly prohibited to retain PW for work.

c. Evaluation of captured material. Captured material of all types, particularly documents, will often lead to the most important results of intelligence, only the skilled eye can decide what is important and what is not important. Small scraps of paper are at times of much more value than maps, etc. The rule therefore should be: All captured material will be evacuated to the G-2 of Division at once. Proper evaluation, however, can only be effected if place of capture and by whom are indicated. Bags containing types of material thrown together in a disorderly fashion and without these markings are practically worthless. Remove all papers from the dead and one of the two identification tags (the other remains with the body) and evacuate them to Division.

d. Rcn and combat patrols. In order to gain a clear picture of the enemy, special rcn and combat patrols are sent out by Division on specific rcn missions. For example: To pry into enemy positions and installations to the front of our own MLR, capturing of PW, etc. Upon completion of the mission, a written report including an overlay by the patrol leader will be submitted to the G-2 of Division as quickly as possible.

e. Other intelligence sources for enemy reconnaissance. Other intelligence sources for enemy rcn are the signal radio-interceptors, the tapping of telephone wires, the employment of agents and spies commuting between the front lines who are commandeered by the G-2 of Division, Air Rcn, etc.

3. Men responsible for keeping the enemy situation up to date at regiment and independent battalions are the respective S-2's.

For the Divisional Commander
UNGER

ANNEX No. 1 to SIXTH US ARMY GROUP WEEKLY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 6

DECLASSIFIED

P 82

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

S[redacted]
By Auth. of
A.C. of S., G-2
Initials: EH
Date: 21 Oct 44

210900A October 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 5

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 21 OCTOBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

The enemy continued falling back on prepared defensive positions in the VOSGES, offering especially stubborn resistance in the central sector (west of the BALLON massive).

The appearance on the front of a great number of fortress battalions strengthens the supposition that after reaching prepared positions in the VOSGES, more mobile units will be withdrawn and assigned to sectors requiring a more considerable build up.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Northern Sector)

At the close of the period the Fifth Panzer and Nineteenth Army forces were disposed on a line:
XURES (Q 2010), BENAMENIL (V 2197), REHERREY (V 2890), XATTEVILLERS (V 1679), MENIL - SUR - BELVITTE (V 2277), JUSSARUPT (V 2751), ROCHESSON (K 3145), LE DAVAL (V 3443), VENTRON (V 3427), RAMONCHAMP (K 2930), FREDERIC FONTAINE (K 2204), MIGNAVILLERS (P 1795), LONGEVELLE - SUR - DOUBS (P 2681), VILLAR LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

a. FIFTH PANZER ARMY

(1) LVIII Panzer Corps:
While the bulk of 11 Panzer Division remained committed North of the FORET de PARROY (left flank of US XV Corps) the enemy is apparently changing his disposition by bringing in elements of the 553rd Infantry Division from the METZ area, committing them east of the FORET de PARROY.

(2) XLVII Panzer Corps:
15 PG and 21 Pz Divisions were strongly committed on the US XV Corps zone. 15 PG Division received considerable replacements (PW states that 104th PGR is up to 90/120 Co strength). Furthermore 56 Fortress Battalion relieved the 51 Fortress MG Battalion, committed in the 15 PG Division sector.

Considering the enemy's evident intention to fall back on the fortified position: SARREBOURG - BLAMONT - BACCARAT, anchored in the North on the marshy area DIEUZE - MITTERHEIM - FENETRANCE, and in the South on the GRAND BALLON massive, mobile units at present committed West of that line can be relieved by static units (Fortress Battalions) and elements of infantry divisions and will become available for other sectors where they are badly needed. 15 PG Division may reasonably be chosen for such a move.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY

(1) LXIV Reserve Corps:
According to captured documents the Northern boundary of 16 Infantry Division has been moved South (FORET de MORTAGNE - ST DIE inclusive). The sector of LXIV Corps is further narrowed by this move.

All three Regiments (221st Res Gren, 223rd Res Gren, 225th Res Gren,) of 16 Infantry Division, as well as the 19 SS Police Regiment, the 49 Fortress MG Battalion and elements of a few Security Regiments, attached to 16 Infantry Division, were identified in the US VI Corps Zone.

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Further South 716 Infantry Division is opposing the US VI Corps with the 726th and 736th Infantry Regiments in line.

189 Infantry Division with its new build up (Sixth Army Group Weekly Summary Number 4, of October 14) and 198 Infantry Division under General Major SCHIEL, with 305th GR, 326th GR, Bn BOEHMAN, 235th Security Battalion, 198 Fusilier Battalion, and I, II, III, IV Battalions of 63rd GAF Regiment in line, were committed on the right flank of the US VI Corps and the left flank of the II French Corps.

(2) IV GAF Corps:

338 Infantry Division was bearing the brunt of the fighting around LE THILLOT, stemming the advance of the French II Corps. During the week the Division was considerably reinforced by the 1034th Fortress Battalion; 40th Fortress MG Battalion; 1433rd Fortress Infantry Battalion and the 291st and 293rd Battalions (constituted of outlaws). The 746th Engineer Battalion, originally assigned to build fortifications, has been added to the build up of combat effectives of the 338 Infantry Division.

Elements of 106 Panzer Brigade were thrown into the battle in the vital sector of the front for which the 338 Infantry Division is assuming responsibility, but there is no indication that this newcomer is under the division. It is rather reasonable to assume that the Brigade remains under the Corps.

According to PW statement 189 Infantry Division has been put under command of IV GAF Corps. Such a change in disposition indicated that IV GAF Corps assumed responsibility for the vital central sector while the LXXXV Corps remains responsible for the BELFORT area, the Southern anchor of the whole defense system in the VOSGES.

(3) LXXXV Corps:

The previously reported appearance of 106 Panzer Brigade in the Corps area has not been confirmed by its engagement on the Corps sector, as the enemy was evidently compelled to throw elements of this mobile unit into action on the endangered portion of the central sector (LE THILLOT).

159 Infantry Division (recently ungraded) with the 9th GR, 251st GR, 1000th Rcn Battalion, the 74th Sec Brigade, and miscellaneous smaller units under its command constitutes the right flank of the Corps, denying the French I Corps access to the BELFORT Gap from the West.

Further South 91 GAF Regiment of the 1st Trng GAF Division is still identified in the French I Corps zone, while the presence of elements of the Brigade von OPPEN, on the right flank of the I French Corps has been confirmed by recent identifications.

c. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Northern Front)

No Change.

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Southern Sector)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were generally disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG - S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL - SUR - ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602), AIGULLES (N 3703), S. QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

Enemy activities were restricted to patrolling. Enemies dispositions have not undergone any change and it is considered that his intentions remain the same.

4. OPERATIONS

During the period the enemy's attention centered on the central zone where stubborn resistance revealed the danger he felt in our drives on the MOSELOTTE Valley, N/W of BROUVELIERURES (V 2560) and against the key terrain features of BRUYERES (V 2457), which was cleared by the end of the period.

(1) FIRST FRENCH ARMY

I French Corps: In the Southern sector of the front an artillery build-up was noticeable during the period around BELFORT, where at least two new battalions were located.

II French Corps: The enemy reacted strongly early in the period to our advance up the MOSELOTTE Valley, after the capture of SAULXURES (K 3137). He defended strongly in the area W of LETT-RAYE (Q 3031), PLANOIS (K 3041), W of ROCHESSON (K 3245) and at CORNIMONT (V 3429) with heavy fighting and counterattacks. During the see-saw course of the fighting, the enemy was able temporarily to re-take HILL 739 (V 3328). His artillery fire was devoted to the sector of the MOSELOTTE Valley from CORNIMONT (V 3429) to LES AMAIS (K 3037) and on TRAVEXIN (K 3528). With capture of LE HAUT DU FAING (V 3431), a key point of the enemy's proposed Winter line was breached and furious counterattacks in this area signified the blow dealt to the Germans as the period ended.

(2) SEVENTH US ARMY

VI Corps: Main emphasis during the period was laid on the area of BRUYERES (V 2457), E of FREMIFONTAINE (V 2264) and BROUVELIEURES (V 2560), both in our steady advances and in the enemy's stubborn defense with all weapons (including AT grenades and bazookas) and counterattacks. About 19 October strong resistance was received from the hill W of JUSSARUPT (V 2752). By the end of the period BRUYERES was cleared and limited withdrawal by the enemy was observed to the E bank of the MORTAGNE River. Close contact continued to be maintained in the area FREMIFONTAINE (V 2264), BROUVELIEURES (V 2560), while the enemy stiffened his defense from dug-in positions to the north.

XV Corps: During the early part of the period, the enemy defended capably with artillery concentrations and automatic fire from well dug-in positions near IGNEY, (W of VAUCOURT (Q 2308). Only moderate opposition was made to advances near EMBERMENIL (Q 2304). By 18 October counterattacks by tanks were being launched in the area (Q 2303), and the enemy continued this aggressive attitude until the 20th, when activity slackened to mixed artillery fires, with Nebelwerfer fire beginning to be noted regularly.

(3) ALPINE FRONT

ABTF: Enemy defensive attitude continued with scattered artillery fire and light patrol activity.

4 DMM: The enemy made a strong raid on TERMIGNON (K 5040) on 19 October, but was forced back. Otherwise the front was quiet.

5. SUPPLIES

The movement of enemy supplies into the two enemy army areas appears from traffic reports to have been maintained without substantial reduction in volume. In view of this heavy traffic and the absence of evidence to indicate the existence of supply shortages, it is not likely that he is experiencing any difficulties in bringing up supplies to Sixth US Army Group front.

Rations are probably supplemented considerably by taking produce and livestock from the land, as in the ST DIE area several car loads of potatoes were moved daily in a Northeasterly direction.

A general shortage of fuel exists due to the strategic bombing of processing and storage installations in Germany and occupied countries. Nineteenth Army fuel requirements however are not apt to be substantial in the present static situation. Its position has been further enhanced by the location of rail heads in the forward areas which permits economical use of motor transport for short hauls with resulting reduction in fuel requirements.

The supply position of the armies under Army Group G is not likely to cause the enemy grave concern while he has full use of the RHINE crossings. That he is preparing for their possible loss is indicated by the assembly of materials for pontoon bridges at STRASSBOURG.

6. MOVEMENTS

Rail movements reported during the past week indicate that the line from SINGEN - RADOLFSZELL via DONAUSCHINGEN - VILLINGEN - OFFENBURG is the principal route used for movement of troops and supplies to STRASSBOURG. Supplies from STRASSBOURG are then forwarded to railhheads at ST DIE, AVRICOURT, SAARBURG and SAVERNE.

Continued rail activity was observed in the MULHOUSE-COLMAR area. Railheads for the Southern area are probably located at MUNSTER, THANN, BELFORT and MONTBELIARD.

The evacuation of factory parts and materials from the BELFORT-MULHOUSE area continues. The route just N of BASLE and the SWISS frontier in the direction of SINGEN is moving empties in a Westerly direction and loaded trains to the East.

In the Northern sector, supply trains appear to be moving from NURNBERG into the KARLSRUHE area over a double-tracked main line, which from HALL may be partly diverted to a secondary line with good connections through to KARLSRUHE.

7. DEFENSES

BELFORT: In the BELFORT area, enemy outposts protecting the western and southwestern approaches to the MLR show a general increase in heavy infantry weapons and artillery. Photo reconnaissance confims the construction of a second MLR running from ROUGEMONT (V 4204) to MERTZEN (V 5488) with a few scattered positions further south indicating that it may be prolonged to the SWISS Border. A high concentration of AA defends the entire BELFORT-MULHOUSE sector. (Annex I is an analysis of distribution of fire power based on Photo Interpretation by the FIRST FRENCH ARMY.)

VOSGES: In the VOSGES, photo reconnaissance shows the MLR to have been extended northward and to be anchored on the swampy area bounded by DIEUZE (Q 2520), MITTERSHEIM (Q 4129), FENETRANCE (Q 4723), RECHICOURT (Q 3407). Roads permitting movements through this area are obstructed by A/T ditches and continuous entrenchments perpendicular to the direction of approach.

GERMANY: The reconditioning of the SIEFGRIED LINE is reported completed, the fortifications having already received their supplies of food and ammunition. The SIEFGRIED DEFENSES are reported being extended to a depth reaching east of FRANKFURT, MANNHEIM, MUNSTER, and the northern regions of the BLACK FOREST. Defenses are also reported under construction along the southern approaches to Germany, in the ALLGAUER ALPS (C 87) and along the INN River Valley to KUFSTEIN (E 39), where, given sufficient time, the Germans would have another SIEGFRIED LINE guarding the outlet of the BRENNER PASS.

Eugene L Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

2 Incls:
Annex #1 - Analysis of distribution of Fire Power.
Annex #2 - Weather Summary for the Middle Rhine Valley for November.

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WEATHER SUMMARY FOR THE MIDDLE RHINE VALLEY FOR NOVEMBER

GENERAL

Weather conditions throughout the Middle Rhine Valley in November continue to be unfavorable for combined military operations. This area lies within the zone of migratory storms which move from the North Atlantic across Central and Northern Europe, bringing rain and overcast skies for prolonged periods. Occasionally, a northeasterly current out of Russia will cause brief periods of clear, cold conditions. These, however, are merely short interruptions in the regular regime. With continued overcast and frequent rain, the soil becomes saturated with moisture, impeding the movement of wheeled vehicles. Poor visibilities and low ceilings, combined with sodden airfield conditions, will limit the use of tactical aircraft on a majority of November days.

TEMPERATURES

The mercury in November shows a marked decline in keeping with the seasonal trend. The general average for the area is near 40 degrees:

Strasbourg	40.0	Karlsruhe	40.5	Nurnberg	39.0
Metz	41.0	Basel	40.6	Munich	37.2

The highest ever registered at Strasbourg in November was 71 degrees, and the lowest on record was 11 degrees. In general, the temperature will reach a daily mean maximum of 44 and a daily mean minimum of 36. Readings below freezing will occur on ten days during this autumn month at this Middle Rhine Valley city.

PRECIPITATION

Rainfall, though still moderate, shows a general decline from the autumnal high in October. The average for the region is close to two inches:

Metz	2.2"	Frankfurt	1.7"	Nurnberg	1.5"
Strasbourg	1.9"	Basel	2.4"	Munich	1.7"

The greatest monthly total ever recorded amounted to 5.0" at Metz and 4.9" at Strasbourg; while the least registered was 0.9" and 0.5", respectively. Twenty-four hour falls of 1.3" at Metz and 1.7" at Strasbourg are the heaviest on record for a single day. The chief characteristic of the rainfall pattern is the tendency to prolonged rain spells. Over sixty per-cent of the rain periods will last for three successive days or more. Measurable rainfall may be expected on the average of fifteen days during the month in the Upper Rhineland. The mercury drops low enough in November for snow. Two to three days of light snow will occur in an average year, although the depth is never great at this season. The heaviest November twenty-four hour fall measured 1.3" at Metz and 1.7" at Strasbourg.

CLOUDINESS AND HUMIDITY

The proximity of the North Atlantic Ocean lends a strong maritime character to the air masses invading the region. The moisture content is high with resultant excessive cloudiness and high humidities. Total cloudiness averages close to 80 per-cent: Metz and mountain stations 80%, Strasbourg and valley locations 76%. Mornings, on the average, are slightly more cloudy than evenings. Absence of sunshine (only 1.2 hours per day) prevents rapid drying, accentuating the humid conditions.

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WEATHER SUMMARY FOR THE MIDDLE RHINE VALLEY FOR NOVEMBER

Humidity content is near the winter peak. Strasbourg shows a 0700A average of 92% and a 1400A mark of 80%, both high figures. The frequency of fogs demonstrates the high moisture content of the air at this season. Metz experiences eight days with heavy fog, while river valley towns in the Rhine valley may have ten to twelve days with fog.

VISIBILITY

Restricted visibility will occur on two-thirds of the days. It will be below 6 miles on 20 mornings a month, below 2½ miles on 14 mornings, and below 1¼ miles on 10 mornings. Visibility improves generally by noon as the fog lifts to a low overcast. Dense fogs with zero-zero conditions often occur in the Vosges Mountains area for two to three days in a row, when valleys experience fog in the mornings only. Obstructions to good vision are a distinct handicap to accurate aerial bombardment at this season of the year.

WIND

The prevailing winds are from the southwest. Contours of the north-south river valleys accentuate the normal flow of cyclonic winds. Seventy-eight percent of the observed wind movement at Strasbourg is from the south thru southwest to west, and similiar conditions exist at Metz 59 percent of the time. The velocities are moderate with an overall average of 9 miles-per-hour. At Strasbourg calms have been experienced 22 percent of the time, velocities between 1 and 7 m.p.h. 64 percent, and between 8 and 18 m.p.h. 14 percent. Gales will occur only once a month.

SURFACE WIND DIRECTION (%)	N	NE	E	SE	S	SW	W	NW	CALM
METZ	4	8	4	5	9	15	10	3	42
STRASBOURG	6	2	1	1	16	35	10	7	22

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DAILY ALMANAC FOR NOVEMBER, 1944

COLMAR-MULHOUSE AREA * 48 00 NORTH 07.30 EAST

NOVEMBER	SUNRISE	SUNSET	MOONRISE	MOONSET	PHASE
1	0715	1712	1814	0800	FULL MOON
2	0717	1710	1850	0917	"
3	0719	1709	1934	1030	"
4	0720	1708	2023	1136	"
5	0722	1707	2119	1232	"
6	0723	1705	2219	1317	"
7	0725	1703	2321	1406	LAST QUARTER
8	0726	1702	----	1426	"
9	0728	1700	0024	1452	"
10	0729	1659	0127	1515	"
11	0731	1657	0230	1536	"
12	0732	1656	0332	1557	"
13	0734	1654	0436	1618	"
14	0735	1653	0539	1640	"
15	0737	1652	0644	1704	NEW MOON
16	0738	1651	0750	1734	"
17	0740	1650	0857	1808	"
18	0741	1649	1000	1851	"
19	0743	1648	1102	1942	"
20	0744	1647	1155	2043	"
21	0746	1646	1241	2150	"
22	0747	1645	1320	2304	"
23	0749	1644	1351	----	FIRST QUARTER
24	0750	1644	1421	0019	"
25	0751	1643	1448	0136	"
26	0752	1642	1513	0254	"
27	0754	1641	1536	0412	"
28	0755	1641	1609	0531	"
29	0757	1640	1633	0650	"
30	0758	1639	1710	0808	FULL MOON

CIVIL TWILIGHT (Sun 6 deg. below horizon; outdoor civilian activity ceases) subtract 35 minutes from sunrise and add 35 minutes to sunset.
NAUTICAL TWILIGHT (Sun 12 deg. below horizon; outline of objects just visible) subtract 75 minutes from sunrise and add 75 minutes to sunset.
ASTRONOMICAL TWILIGHT (Sun 18 deg. below horizon; synonymous with darkness; same as British First and Last Light) subtract 110 minutes from sunrise and add 110 minutes to sunset.

ALL TIMES ARE "A" ARMY TIME OR VIENNA MERIDIAN (15 DEG. EAST) TIME, WHICH IS ONE HOUR IN ADVANCE OF "Z" GREENWICH TIME.

ANNEX No 2 to SIXTH ARMY GROUP Weekly Intelligence Summary No 5

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET
By Authority of
A.C. of S., G-2
Initials: [illegible]
Date: 15 Oct 44

150900A October 1944

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 4

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 15 OCTOBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

During the period the enemy was forced back toward his prepared defensive positions in the VOSGES. The reorganization of his divisions was effected by the amalgamation of various battle groups into the framework of larger units. Divisions on either end of the front have assumed responsibility for definite sectors. The narrowing of the sector assigned to the center corps will permit regrouping of their components into more organic tactical units.

The enemy is reacting strongly to Allied attacks all along the line, particularly in those sectors where he is being backed up into his constructed defensive positions. Units with counterattacking capabilities, such as 106th Panzer Brigade, are being brought into the front line. Indications of considerable artillery reinforcements arriving from STRASSBURG are substantiated by an increased use of artillery.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Northern Sector)

At the close of the period the Fifth Panzer and Nineteenth forces were generally disposed on a line: VAUCOURT (Q 2308), REHERREY (V 2890), XATTEVILLERS (V 1680), BRU (V 2273), FAYS (V 2156), JUSSARUPT (V 2752), ROCHESSON (K 3245), LE MENIL (K 3233), CHATEAU LAMBERT (K 3127), BELVERNE (K 2401), MIGNAVILLERS (P 2795), LONGEVILLE-SUR-DOUBS (P 2681), VILLAR LES BLAMOUNT (A 3564).

a. FIFTH PANZER ARMY

(1) 58 Panzer Corps:
The bulk of 11 Panzer Division is committed on the left flank of US XV Corps. (North of FORET de PARROY.)

(2) 47 Panzer Corps:
15th Panzer Grenadier Division sidestepped to the South and its bulk is committed together with 21st Panzer Division on the XV Corps sector. Elements of the Division were badly mauled in the last engagements. A prisoner of war stated that the second and third battalions of 115 PGR went to G ermany for refitting. Whether the 16th Infantry Division is under the 47th Panzer Corps or the 64th Reserve Corps is as yet unclear.

b. NINETEENTH ARMY

(1) 64 Reserve Corps:
Elements of 15th PG Division and the 16th Infantry Division are committed on the left flank of US VI Corps. The 716th Infantry Division and elements of the 198th and 189th Infantry Divisions are opposing the US VI Corps on the rest of the sector. PW's statements confirm that the Divisions are in process of reorganization. The 198th received, on Oct 9, 6-800 replacements, said to have come from Germany, as well as new guns.

The 189th Infantry Division (recently upgraded) has under its command: B G BAUER, B G MARKEL, 192nd Security Regiment, 200th Security Regiment, Police Battalion MULHOUSE, 3/685th A A Battalion, 198th Fusilier Battalion, 602 Mobile Battalion, 608 Mobile Battalion, B G MAHNKE. As the organic units of the Division were destroyed (except for the 38th Reserve Jaeger Battalion and 163rd Grenadier Battalion) the units at present under 189th should be considered as a basic build up of its strength. General OTTENBACHER, who relieved General SCHWERIN at the beginning of October, is in turn reported relieved by the newly promoted General BAUER.

(2) 4 GAF Corps:

338th Infantry Division inder the command of General ACHMANN is opposing the French II Corps. According to a captured document the new Divisional organization is as follows: 757th GR with 1 Battalion C/V, 333rd GR with 2 Battalion C/V, 308th GR, 338th AR, 338th Signal Battalion, 338th Engineer Battalion and 338th AT and 338th A A Companies.

The 308th Grenadier Regiment which has apparently not received replacements is being withdrawn to the rear possibly in order to reorganize. 159th Reserve Infantry Division is opposing the French II Corps. As has been reported in Weekly Summary No 3, the Division is being reorganized on the basis of a 1944 T/O.

(3) 85 Corps:

A change in the disposition of the enemy is apparent in the Northern sector of the French I Corps. Reports suggest that the 106th Panzer Brigade (FELDHERRNHALLE) is relieving elements of the 1st Flieger Training Division. Furthermore, elements of the Brigade von OPPEN (KASSEBEER D/V Regiment with I Battalion BOSCH, II Battalion RAEDECKER, III Battalion MURMANN) have been identified on the right flank of the French I Corps.

c. NINETEENTH ARMY RESERVE

It has been established that the Russian FREIWILLIGE STAMM Division is the 19th Security Division and possible new arrivals for this group may continue to be considered as general reserve.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH - SIXTH US ARMY GROUP (Northern Front)

	STRENGTH	TANKS	ARTILLERY
SEVENTH US ARMY			
Units in contact-	9,800	40	
Supporting units-	16,000		168
T O T A L	25,800	40	168
FIRST FRENCH ARMY			
Units in contact-	10,000	25	
Supporting units-	15,000		150/180
T O T A L	25,000	25	150/180
SIXTH US ARMY GROUP			
Units in contact-	19,800	65	
Supporting units-	31,000		318/348
Estimated Reserve W of Rhine	30,000		
T O T A L	80,800	65	318/348

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Southern Sector)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were generally disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL-SUR-ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (P 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

Only patrolling and fire fights are reported on the French-Italian Border. It is considered that the enemy is withdrawing East, leaving a rearguard and some artillery to cover his retreat.

Strength: 12-15,000, including Italian units.

4. OPERATIONS

During the period the enemy gradually gave way on the Northern sector (FORET de PARROY), while holding fast and consolidating his advantageous positions in the central sector and aggressively denying us any advances on the BELFORT Axis.

(1) First French Army: On the N flank, CHATEAU LAMBERT (K 3126) and LE THILLOT (K 3129) remained strong points in the enemy's aggressive defense with counterattacks being made early in the period at LA PILLE (K 2824). His withdrawal from REMANVILLERS (K 2831) and RAMONCHAMP (K 2930) was forced only after strong counterattacks had degenerated into delaying action behind heavy artillery concentrations. Our advance up the MOSELOTTE Valley (vic K 2826) then progressed with little opposition. Counterattacks, however, proved effective enough to deny our troops the occupation of the HILL 763 (K 2826) and the area W of ROCHESSON (K 3245). The end of the period was characterized by counterattacks supported by heavy tanks and artillery in defense of PLANOIS (K 3041).

(2) VI Corps: On the 3rd Division front, LE THOLY was stubbornly held from dug-in positions and enemy mortar and artillery fire forced our patrols to withdraw from HILL 781 (W of the town) at the end of the period. About 13th October the enemy began to withdraw from the area of JULIENRUPT (V 2440). In the central sector, the Germans utilized heavy mortar and artillery fire to frustrate our advance on HERPEMONT (V 2652) and JUSSARUPT (V 2752). Toward the end of the period he withdrew from BEAUMENIL (V 2554) leaving the town heavily mined. On the 45th Division front the enemy began to stabilize his lines, but continued his stiff resistance along a line FREMIFONTAINE (V 2264) to W of BROUVELIEURES (V 2650). The infiltration and close-in fighting of the beginning of the period became a defense based on well dug-in positions as construction activity went on in area W of BROUVELIEURES to BRUYERES (V 2457). Counterattacks with tank and artillery support testified to the senstivity of the enemy in this area.

(3) XV Corps: Since relinquishment of the FORRET de PARROY area, enemy activity has been light, consisting mostly of patrols and scattered artillery, and NEBELWERFER fire as the enemy withdrew from MANONVILLER (V 2099) and MOVACOURT (Q 1809) to dig in E of FORET de PARROY and along the ridge W of VAUCOURT (Q 2308).

(4) F A B T F: The enemy continued his defensive attitude as the volume of artillery fire increased, without a corresponding increase in the number of guns.

5. SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORTATION

a. FUEL DISTRIBUTION IN THE GERMAN ARMY

Of particular interest is a PW interrogation report which provides insight to German methods of fuel supply in France, based on the experience of 198th Infantry Division in static and fast moving situations.

The report, believed reliable, states that gasoline is drawn directly from Germany by the Army which in turn ships the fuel to Corps where Divisions call for their allotments. Within divisions the lower echelons down to company call for fuel supplies from their higher echelons.

In a static situation all echelons make requests for gasoline every two or three days. 198th Infantry Division under such circumstances is said to have consumed 1500 gallons of fuel every 2-3 days.

In a fast moving situation divisional requirements rose to 5,000-6,000 gallons every 1-2 days.

PW stated that procedure even for lowest echelon of his Infantry Division was to have on hand enough fuel for movement of 350 km. (218.7 miles) without refueling. Whenever the tactical situation permits, and divisional fuel requirements are in large quantities, divisions may call directly at Army depots for gasoline supplies.

b. SUPPLY AND MOVEMENTS

During the period 21 Sept - Oct 5th, German railroads, continued to bring troops and supplies westward across the RHINE. These shipments are reported to include 100 field guns, 50 AA guns, and several heavy railroad guns which moved westward through STRASBURG. Activity at KARLSRUHE seems to have been chiefly troop and supply movement to the VOSGES and SAAR fronts.

The rail lines along the SWISS border between WALDSHUT (B 39) and SINGEN were very active in movement of supplies. Although part of the activity may be involved in large-scale industrial evacuation of ALSACE, much of the remainder must be military.

Despite constant air attacks during the past week, the enemy continued heavy rail movements to supply and reenforce his defensive position in the VOSGES.

c. TRANSPORTATION

An interesting light is thrown on the railway transportation problem in Germany by a recent report whcih pointed out that during the first weeks of September more than 400 locomotives were destroyed. Because of the trained-labor shortage, as well as lack of essential materials, repair work on the damaged trains was rendered practically impossible. Increased waterway traffic as a supplementary means of transport has been reported in the upper RHINE area.

6. DEFENSES

German preparations for war on their own soil continue. The party leader of BREGENZ (C 5080) is quoted as saying during a September conference that every German locality would be prepared for defense, and the civilians would be armed. A large supply of prefabricated barracks which was recently brought to the BAVARIAN ALPS was declared by workmen to be intended for the use of the German "MAQUIS". Indications of a possible headquarters may be gained by the report from French ground observers that feverish activity is to be seen around BERCHTESGARTEN, with numerous underground telephone lines being laid for a 50 km. radius around the OBERSALZBERG Peak, which overlooks it.

This weeks activity has been characterized by the strengthening of the enemy MLR in the VOSGES. This line has now been extended northward from BACCARAT to SARREBOURG and along the many valleys leading N E through the VOSGES. A high concentration of defensive positions and fire power has been established at MOYENMOUTIER (V 3776) where part of the MLR leads up the valley to SEMONES. Wire has been seen for the first time and in some sections the trenches are camouflaged to blend with the natural features of the terrain. Scattered defensive positions have been established between FRAIZE and LE THILLOT (V 2929) blocking the few avenues of access through that area.

Around BELFORT, there has been a general increase in the artillery and A A concentration and continued digging of trenches and A/T ditches strengthening the positions in the BELFORT-DANNEMARIE Area.

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. ARMY

G-2 War Office MIRS London

K-14822

080900A October 1944

S15/25

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 3

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 8 OCTOBER 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

Recent moves and identifications of enemy troops clearly indicate that Sixth Army Group is now facing a major portion of Fifth Panzer Army's two identified Panzer Corps (47 and 58), as well as a Nineteenth Army that has, according to evidence in a captured order, sufficiently recovered its balance to start reorganizing its divisions from the present collection of independent battle groups, which range the strength scale from exhausted battalions to strong brigades to weak divisions.

The major move during the period involved the withdrawal of the Sixty-Sixth Reserve Corps. There is no evidence as to its intended use or destination, but the units it formerly commanded continue to be identified. Therefore, it may well be assumed that it is moving out of the area or is to organize defenses in the rear (its role during the RHONE Valley retreat of Nineteenth Army).

Following the withdrawal of Sixty-Sixth Corps, PW's identifications indicate that 47 Panzer Corps sidestepped almost as far south as RAMBERVILLERS. Assuming that the 47-58 Panzer Corps boundary was adjusted accordingly, this should place all of 47 Panzer Corps and part of 58 Panzer Corps on the front of Sixth Army Group.

While not confirmed from gound sources, the TAC/R report of heavy rail movement South of STRASBOURG on the 8th, may have been connected with the arrival of new units in the COLMAR-MULHOUSE area.

The Alpine front remains generally static. However, adding the enemy's overall situation in Italy to the fact that winter brings a communications problem through the passes, it is doubtful whether the enemy will much longer elect to maintain any of his troops West of the more easily defended passes.

2. SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Northern Sector)

At the close of the period the Nineteenth Army forces were generally disposed on a line: FORET DE PARROY (Q 1806), VAXAINVILLE (V 2891), XATTEVILLERS (V 1680), BRU (V 2273), FAYS (V 2156), HERPELMONT (V 2652), THIEFOSSE (K 2839), LE MENIL (K 3233), CHEVESTRAYE (K 2816) RONCHAMP (K 2209), ONANS (P 2286), LONGEVELLE - SUR - DOUBS (P 2681), VILLAR LES BLAMONT (A 3564).

a. FIFTH PANZER ARMY

1. 58 Panzer Corps:

11 Panzer Division, 111 and 113 Panzer Brigades (both apparently absorbed by 11 Panzer Division).

15 Panzer Grenadier Division (this is included upon the assumption that 47 Panzer Corps has assumed command of 16 Infantry Division --see below).

2. 47 Panzer Corps

21 Panzer Division, 112 Panzer Brigade (latter absorbed by 21 Panzer Division).

16 Infantry Division (as PW identifications confirm the division was not withdrawn with 66 Corps, it is assumed this unit came under command of 47 Corps, when the latter sidestepped southward).

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b. NINETEENTH ARMY

1. 64 Reserve Corps:

B G TAEGLICHSBECK, a strong group which was under 64 Reserve Corps has not been located lately while the 716 Infantry Division and the 189 Reserve Infantry Division remain in the sector. The 716 Infantry Division absorbed some elements of the B G BRODOWSKI indicating a trend in reorganizing

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the disrupted elements of the Division. The 189 Infantry Division, also in process of reorganization (upgraded from Tng Division), absorbed the B G WITTE.

2. 4 GAF Corps:

The 338 Infantry Division (B G LOPAU) including absorbed elements of the 242, and 244 Infantry Divisions, the 198 Infantry Division (reinforced by the 63 GAF Regiment), and the reorganized 159 Infantry Reserve Division remain the chief tactical units under the Corps. Added to this a number of Battle Groups are on the front in the BELFORT area (MENKE, SPITZMULLER, ROTH and BOSCH). The BODENSEE Regiment, a new arrival. operates as a B G; however, one Bn has been lately identified in the 64 Corps Area.

3. 85 Corps:

The 1st Flieger Division still remains on the front south of BELFORT, although repeated statements of PW's indicate the withdrawal of the Division to the MULHOUSE area.

A newly identified B G ESCHERICH, composed of Infantry, SP arty, and tanks, is evidently being brought in to the line in order to strengthen the position of the enemy in the BELFORT area, weakened by the departure of the 11 Panzer Division.

c. NINETEENTH ARMY RESERVE

Battle Group VON OPPEN, the 30 SS Division, the Russian STAMM Division, the 19 Sec Division and various elements reorganized in the MULHOUSE area, may be considered as general reserve. The majority of these are of low combat value. This group may also be strengthened by new arrivals (the 100 Light Infantry Division, elements reported in the MULHOUSE area).

In connection with the reshuffle of the enemy's dispositions these units may be put under the 66 Reserve Corps and the 85 Corps.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH ON SIXTH US ARMY FRONT

	Effectives	Overall	Tanks	Arty
U. S. XV Corps Sector	5,700	28,250	45	56
U. S. VI Corps Sector	11,150	17,550	35	132
First French Army Sector	6,400	8,300	--	--
Nineteenth Army Reserve	8,500	13,000	30GHQ	50-60GHQ
T O T A L	31,750	67,100	110	188-198

3. SIXTH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Southern Sector)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth Army Group on the Alpine Front were generally disposed along the line: ALBERTVILLE (Z 6683), BOURG - S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL - SUR - ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602), AIGULLES (N 3703), S PAUL - S U (P 5055), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

The German 75 Corps remains responsible for the defense of the Alpine Passes. Generally the disposition remains unchanged. The 34 Infantry Division, elements of the 5 Mountain Division, elements of the 90th Panzer Gren Division, the 157 Reserve Division and various smaller elements (888 Mtn Bn, MEER ALPEN Regt), are still on the front. The 148 Infantry Reserve Division, ALPEN JUGEND units and the Italian MONTE ROSA and SAN MARCO Divisions remain in the region west of TURIN.

The LOMBARDY Corps has been identified in this area from a captured document. Its composition is as yet unknown, but it probably includes at least one of the German Divisions on the Mediterranean flank.

Estimated Strength: 12-15 thousand men including the Italian units.

4. OPERATIONS

During the period, the enemy showed a determination to hold the center of the line, clinging tenaciously to strategic terrain features, while offering less resistance on the Southern flank. In the North his efforts were concentrated on holding the FORET de PARROY.

S E C R E T

a. SEVENTH ARMY

(1) XV Corps: Throughout the period, the enemy, despite stubborn defense by use of tank-held road blocks, counter-attacks, and mines, was being forced back from the FORET de PARROY. By the end of the period, only possession of its SE portion remained in doubt. Elsewhere in the Corps sector counter-attacks took place in the area of ANGLEMONT (V 2286), MARAINVILLER (V 1699) and MENIL - FLIN (V 2089) with some nebelwerfer fire noted.

(2) VI Corps: The occupation of BAMBERVILLERS (V 1872) forced the enemy to concentrate on blocking further advance through the road net extending from the town. His immediate reaction was explosive, as he utilized all arms and reinforced the surrounding terrain and brought steady artillery fire on the town. By the end of the period he had relinquished only the forest area N E of the town and was still stubbornly defending JEANMENIL (V 2271).

In the central sector, the enemy's defense centered on line of advance GRANDVILLERS (V 2160), BROUVELIEURES (V 2560), which he defended through counter-attacks and the use of up to 15 tanks. By the end of the period his defense had fallen back to the area W of BROUVELIEURES. N of this area AUTREY (V 2267) fell, despite stubborn delaying action, while to the South BROYERES (V 2457) remained in enemy hands.

From LEPANGES (V 2153) to VAGNEY (K 2345), the enemy's stubborn defense decreased as he withdrew his forces to straighten his lines, leaving SP guns and delaying forces behind. By the end of the period resistance was weakening as VAGNEY (K 2643) was mopped up. LE THOLY (V 2643) continued to be heavily defended, and infiltrations were observed in the area.

b. FIRST FRENCH ARMY

The enemy's defense during the period has centered about the highway LURE-BELFORT in the form of counter-attacks, infiltration, and continuous heavy artillery, including that from the long range guns in the BELFORT forts. Occupation of ROUCHAMPS (K 2309) was prevented until 3 October, while counter-attacks occurred in the vicinity of RECOLOGNE (K 2109) and FRESNE (K 2415). Infiltration were attempted in the FORET de MONTAGNE (K 3022), while pockets remained to be cleared up in areas BEUVAROUX (K 2408) and LE RHIEN (K 2211). At the end of the period counter-attacks took place West of LAPILLE (K 2824) and N of CHEVESTRAYE (K 2815). The enemy was reported sending replacements to MESIL (K 3232). Advance through the BROCHE and MORBIED Passes was strongly resisted. In the DOUBS River sector patrols were contacted.

c. A B T F

The enemy continued his defensive attitude, utilizing harassing artillery and aggressive patrols of up to 40 men. As the period progressed, he made use of ambush tactics against our patrols. By the end of the period contact was made at CAMP DES FOURCHES, as freezing weather began to set in.

5. MOVEMENTS

Inclement weather during the week hampered continued observation of motor and rail movements behind the enemy lines. However, enough was observed to indicate that the enemy was still using railheads well forward of the Rhine for the supply of his troops despite our fighter-bomber attacks. Several days of good weather may change his mind in as much as one days activity netted 14 locomotives and 26 boxcars destroyed by the 7th Army air support. The enemy also appears to be well enough organized to wait until night for his large motor movements. Only light scattered M/T movements have been observed during the period by daylight in the Sixth Army Group area. An increased rail movement was noted on 7 October when 22 trains were observed moving predominantly E and NE on rail lines from (Q 7317 to R 6359). Barrage balloons were reported over the West STRASBOURG yard indicating increased air defense of the railheads. There was heavy rail activity on the 8th between STRASBOURG and SELESTAT.

2 Incls:
Annex #1 - German Defenses of the VOGES and the BELFORT Gap.
Annex #2 - Captured Order: Reorganization of 159 Reserve Division.

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GERMAN DEFENSES OF THE VOSGES AND THE BELFORT GAP

In keeping with the Fuhrer's order to hold the VOSGES-BELFORT line at all costs, the German's are feverishly continuing the strengthening of the defenses blocking all routes offering eastward passage. A line of fire trenches, AT ditches, and pillboxes with machine guns, AT guns, and artillery, runs from BLAMONT through FRAIZE with the greatest density around ST. MARGUERITE, blocking the approach to SAALES PASS. (See attached sketch).

In addition to the fortifications enumerated, the terrain itself is well adapted for defense, since the narrow defiles of the Vosges allow little maneuver room and are easily defended. The approaching inclement weather will materially aid the enemy.

In the BELFORT region, several lines of defense are reported:

a. The GIROMAGNY - CHAVANNE - HERIMONCOURT line, a forward position of light field fortifications.

b. The FRANIER - COUTHENANS - CHAVANNE line, a heavier line of field defenses, forming an outpost of the MLR.

c. The GIROMAGNY - MONTBELIARD - HERIMONCOURT line, (with an alternate position CHALONVILLARS - DELLE) apparently meant to be the MLR, and heavily organized with fire-trenches, AT ditches, pillboxes, AT guns, and artillery.

d. The ROUGEMONT - DANNEMARIE - MERTZEN line which continues SE to the Swiss Border, is still under construction.

e. A ROUGEMONT - DELLE line may exist.

There is considerable activity around BELFORT itself with indications pointing to the manning of most of the old forts. Earthen defenses are being prepared on the slopes and around the forts, and many of the roads between them are being mined, as are roads leading to BELFORT. The shoulders are already mined especially in defiles and at all possible parking areas. This is particularly true on the LE THILLOT - GIROMAGNY; MONTBELIARD - BELFORT; DELLE - BELFORT roads. A.A. defenses have been increased in the BELFORT - MULHOUSE AREA.

The quality of present enemy resistance in the REMIREMONT area may be due in part to his relatively incomplete defenses of the GERARDMER - SCHLUCHT route to COLMAR and the Rhine Plain. In the area to the north, and in the Belfort Gap, his defenses have reached a point where he can adopt a more defensive attitude.

ANNEX No 1 to SIXTH ARMY GROUP Weekly
Intelligence Summary No 3

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A captured document dated 24 September 1944 gives the following information on reorganization of the 251st Reserve Grenadier Regiment:

A. The 19th German Army has ordered the reorganization of the 159th Reserve Infantry Division; the table of organization will be that of the Infantry Division 1944.

B. However, only the men and materiel now available may be used for this reorganization.

C. The 251st Reserve Regiment is organized as follows:

Res. Gr. Bn. 205 as I Bn.

Res. Gr. Bn. 57 as II Bn.

13 (Infantry Gun) Company

Headquarters Company

Reorganization of a 14th Company is proposed for a future date.

D. The 251st Reserve Grenadier Bn will be reorganized into three rifle companies and one heavy weapons company. The machine gun sections of the heavy weapons company may not be attached to the rifle companies until the heavy weapons company shall have been completely reorganized.

The companies are composed of one headquarters section, 3 combat sections and a supply section. Effectives of the 2d Company as of 24 September: 18 noncoms, 87 men.


E. A field replacement battalion under the orders of Major Zollner, CP at Giromagny, is established. The field replacement battalion is charged with the instruction of all men in the division not already trained for infantry combat.

F. Men belonging to the Fortress Cadre Bns shall be returned to those units.

G. A report of all personnel belonging to the 16th, 189th, 198th, 338th, and 716th Infantry Divisions will be furnished. These men will be returned to their original divisions. Same procedure will be followed for personnel of the frontier guards, State railroads and the German labor service.

ANNEX No 2 to SIXTH ARMY GROUP Weekly Intelligence Summary No 3.

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COLMAR
MAIN ROADS
RIVERS

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Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

030900A October 1944.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCY SUMMARY NUMBER - 2

For Week Ending 30 September 1944.

I. GENERAL SUMMARY.

During the period, the enemy used increased artillery and some armor to cover his withdrawal and reorganization. The loss of EPINAL forced him to abandon the Moselle line, and fall back to the strong defensive terrain of the Vosges. His southern anchor remains in the fortified BELFORT region, but there is no naturally strong position between NANCY and the Saverne Gap. Armor as a reenforcement of that area is a logical development, and SHAEF reports the appearance of the Fifth Panzer Army there.

On the Alpine front, the situation remains static, with no sign of substantial enemy withdrawal.

2. ENEMY DISPOSITION.

A. Northeastern Front.

At the close of the period, 19th Army forces were generally disposed on a line: HENAMENIL (Q1409)--CROISMARE (Q1401)--VAXAINVILLE (V2791)--MENARMONT (V1981)--RAMBERVILLERS (V1872)--AUTREY (V2267)--PIEEREPONT (V2263)--DEYCIMONT (V1951)--ST. JEAN DU MARCHE (V2250)--TENDON (V2247)--CLEURIE (V2240)--THIEFOSSE (K2839)--FREDRUPT (K2732)--CHATEAU LAMBERT (K3027)--MIELLIN (K3022)--CHEVESTRAYE (K2816)--FRESSE (K2515)--RONCHAMP (K2309)--LOMONT (K2200)--MIGNAVILLERS (P1795)--FAIMBE (P2285)--COLOMBIER CHATELOT (P2480)--LONGEVILLE SUR DOUBS (P2581)--VILLERS SOUS ECOT (P2978),-VILLAR LES BLAMONT (A3564).

(1) 66 Reserve Corps (East of LUNEVILLE--RAMBERVILLE area).

The 21 Panzer Division seems to remain under 66 Reserve Corps, together with 16 Infantry Division, supported by Battle Group STENGER and Battle Group JACKEL (a patched-up mixture of GAF service troops and other personnel with little combat training) and Battle Group OTTENBACHER, consisting of artillery units, engineer units and infantry.

(2) 64 Reserve Corps (area East of REMIREMONT).

Composition remains unchanged, except that Battle Group WITTE has been incorporated into Battle Group SCHWERIN (remmants of 189 Infantry Division). Remnants of the Battle Group BRODOWSKI (General BRODOWSKI is a Prisoner of War) seem to be incorporated into the 716 and 189 Infantry Divisions.

(3) 4 GAF Corps:

The 159 Infantry Division, broken up into several Battle groups, probably all under Gen. DEGENER, has been reinforced by Battle Group MENKE. Battle Group LOPAU, consisting of remnants of 338 Infantry Division and 242 and 244 Infantry Divisions, has received reinforcements, which may indicate an attempt to reorganize the group on divisional lines.

(4) 85 Corps:

The BODENSEE Regiment, which has recently been identified in the Corps sector, cannot be considered an effective substitute for the 11 Panzer Division, recently removed from the Corps sector and sent to bolster the area east of NANCY. If the First Flieger Division sh

wise be withdrawn, as French reports indicate is possible, the 85 Corps would no longer be capable of holding the vital BELFORT area. In that case, reenforcements would have to be brought from Germany, or found in the remnants of destroyed units reorganized in the neighborhood of MULHOUSE. Should the German High Command consider it necessary to withdraw a corps into general reserve, the 85 Corps would seem the most logical candidate.

(5) Estimate: Approximate Strength of 19th Army at close of period:

80 - 100 tanks
24,000 - 28,000 men, capable of infantry action.

B. ALPINE FRONT.

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth U.S. Army Group on the Alpine Front were generally disposed along the line: GRIMALDI (S-8088)--CASTILLON (S-7594)--ROGUE BILLERE (N-6514)--ST. MARTIN VESUBIE (N-6020)--ST SAUVER (N-4823)--ISOLA (N-4535)--JAUSIERS (P-5045)--M. AIGUILLERRE (N-4492)--MONTEGENEVRE (K-4602)--M. TABOR (K-3022)--MODANE (K-4132)--BESSANS (H-5261)--BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H-5676)--BOURG ST MAURICE (Z-4680)--ALBERTVILLE (Z-6683).

The German 75 Corps remains responsible for the defense of the Alpine passes. It has under command the 34 Infantry Division (GrIMALDI area); elements of the 5 Mtn Div (vic LARCHE Pass); 148 Res Div (by now pulled back into the rear zone); 157 Reserve Division (MODANE area): some few elements of the 90 Pz Gr Division (VAL DE STURA area): the MEERES-ALPEN Regiment (vic. of PRINARDO, N-4255): and the ALPEN JUGEND units which are believed to be in the VAL D'OSTA region. The two to three Italian Divisions of the 75 Corps have been moved nearer to the front which may indicate their possible future employment. It would seem risky to replace the Germans with Italians, as all reports confirm their very low morale and low combat efficiency. The estimated corps strength remains unchanged: 30 tanks and 12,000 to 15,000 men.

3. - OPERATIONS.

a. XV Corps:

The beginning of the period was marked by an upsurge in artillery activity in the areas of Foret de PARROY and Foret de MONDON (V1896). An enemy defensive area based on World War I defenses extended from MANONVILLER (V2099)--DOMEVRE (V3196) to AVRICOURT (Q3206). Resistance was heavy north of MARAINVILLER (V1699). The enemy strongly defended the north bank of the VEZOUSE River, holding HABLAINVILLE (V2591) and AZERAILLES (V2388). At the end of the period, the enemy continued to resist our attempts to enter the Foret de PARROY.

b. Seventh Army:

Armored concentrations northeast and southeast of LUNEVILLE (V0799) were active early in the week. The enemy remained aggressive in the areas of BEMONT (K2447) and CREMANVILLER (K2645); TENDON (V2147) and JEUXEY (V0757) were occupied only after strong resistance, including Mark VI tanks, had been overcome. Resistance began to decrease as scattered delaying groups were encountered in the Foret de FAITE (V1857) and in POMPIERRE (V1263) and GIRECOURT (V1561), behind which defensive positions were reported being dug. At the end of the period resistance north and northeast of EPINAL had become disorganized, while strong forces opposed our occupation of ST. HELENE (V2066) and GUGENCOURT (V1761).

C. First French Army:

On 25 September, the First French Army was confronting an enemy

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line at the entrauce of the BELFORT Gap, heavily defended by strongpoints and artillery. Our capture of COLOMBIER CHTELOT (P2480) and ST. MAURICE ECHELOTTE (P2580) provoked such a reaction that our troops were forced to withdraw. Strong points at SECENANS (P1992), GRANGES LA VILLE (P1894) and GEMONVAL (P2090) were aggressively held, while only moderate resistance was offered at LYOFFAN (K1903)--CLAIRE GOUTTE (K2294). Infantry opposition began to decrease and we were able to occupy MELAY (K1920). The enemy then flared up again at the end of the period, using artillery-supported infantry and scattered tanks in a series of counterattacks on the axis: MAGNY--JOBERT--LYOFFAN: at FREDERIC-FONTAINE (K2305) and at CHEVESTRAYE (K2816).

d. Alpine Sector.

On the Alpine front, the enemy continued his defensive attitude, reacting swiftly to our patrol activities. He held a line of strong points extending: GRIMALDI--CASTILLON--MOULINET--E. ST. MARTIN VESUBIE--ST. ETIENNE TIMEE--LARCHE. Artillery fire was general from forts on MT. BARBONNET and MT. AGAESEN (vic. SOSPEL). Near the end of the period, MENTON was under heavy shellfire, as the enemy continued his static defense.

(G-2 INTELLIGENCE SUM.#2,-wky-)
(- for Pd. ending 30 Sept.44)

E. L. Harrison

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Colonel, GSC
A. C. of S., G-2

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 1

FOR WEEK ENDING 24 SEPT 1944

1. GENERAL SUMMARY

During the period 17 to 24 September, the enemy was forced to continue his retreat. However, the rate of retreat had decreased considerably and increasing resistance was being met on all sectors of the Southern FRANCE front.

Southwest FRANCE was completely abandoned by the enemy, with the exception of garrisons estimated at 12,000 men in LA ROCHELLE and 10,000 in the GIRONDE estuary. A total of some 60,000 men remain to be rounded up in the whole area. Heavy losses in personnel were suffered with the complete breakdown of transportation and salvage of material was negligible. The rapid advance of our troops up the Rhone valley forced upon him the necessity of funneling the remnants of these forces through the gap between the LOIRE and RHONE rivers before junction could be made by the Allied forces in that area. The forces rescued consisted mainly of security and training units which were necessary for the bolstering of the defensive positions the enemy had to man west of the Rhine.

This rescue the enemy executed by using his armored and mobile forces in the LXXXV Corps to delay our advance up the RHONE valley, banking on the difficult terrain between the river and the Alps and JURA ranges to slow us sufficiently in that area. Meanwhile, the LXVI Res Corps and Battle Group OTTENBACHER came across FRANCE below the LOIRE River, forming the North flank of the protective corridor.

The junction of these forces completed, the enemy was anxious to straighten his own lines and connect with the 1st Army to the North. His forces were split up into battle groups, due to the impossibility of bringing up replacements for his organic units, the loss of experienced officer personnel, and the necessity for controlling the mass of small loose units in the area. With the relatively stronger corps on the flanks, LXXV on the South and LXVI Res on the North, the miscellaneous remnants comprising the LXIV and IV GAF Corps retreated toward the BELFORT Gap and the VOSGES. The flank corps were used to deliver counter-attacks which prevented outflanking of the center corps until they were able to reach the natural defensive positions in the VOSGES.

The enemy held two strong defensive bastions at BELFORT and EPINAL, on either side of the VOSGES. His Southern flank runs across BELFORT and the difficult terrain to the SWISS border, from which area he seems to be removing his last armored formation (11 PZ Div). Defensive works, terrain, a large number of second rate troops and the possible arrival of reinforcements (?100 JAG Div) seem to satisfy him as to his ability to hold this area. The VOSGES mountains, offering natural positions for defense which the enemy has built up considerably form the center of his line. The armored strength to the North completes the line facing the SIXTH U S Army Group. The build-up in armored strength which is continuing along the German 1st and 19th Army boundary shows that the enemy is obviously aware of the danger to his forces should any penetration in the LUNEVILLE area open up the road net to STRASBOURG and the RHINE. In this whole area the enemy must prevent a breakthrough to the RHINE which could trap his forces between that barrier to rapid movement and the SWISS border. The decision as to the fate of the RHINE bridges, as far as the enemy is concerned, depends directly on his ability to time correctly the last possible moment at which he can use them for escape. On t his front, the enemy shows every intention of making full use of the defensive possibilities offered by the line he now holds.

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29 AUG 1946

S.G.M.A. 15-44 - 1800 - 250,000

On the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier there is no evidence for expecting any change in the enemy's defensive attitude. The presence of an initially large number of troops in this area was due to a faulty appreciation of our intentions. The nature of the terrain is unfavorable for military operations from FRANCE into ITALY under the best of conditions and the imminent approach of winter will make them virtually impossible. The increasing demand for troops in other areas has already resulted in a thinning out of his forces-elements of both 42 JAGER Div and 90 PANZER GRENADIER are now on the ITALIAN front, while the equivalent of one regiment of the latter has definitely moved out of Western ITALY--and no reinforcements are available. With the ADRIATIC front rapidly deteriorating and the events in the BALKANS making an escape route through Northeast ITALY an absolute necessity, the military situation will outweigh political considerations and force the enemy to withdraw even more forces from the FRANCO-ITALIAN border.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS

At the start of the period, the enemy apparently was planning his defense on a pivotal line based on BELFORT and extending toward the VOSGES and a junction with the German First Army. Initially, prepared positions were utilized at L'ISLE and in the area of FAUCOGNEY (K1624) where counterattacks supported the defense. Tanks were utilized in an organized opposition which covered the withdrawal of the LXIV Corps toward LUXEUIL. Great sensitivity to our patrol's probes in the DOUBS River area indicated that this was a focal point in the enemy's defense.

By 18/19 September, the enemy's stubborn resistance at such points as GENEY and GOUGEROLLES was slackening, as slight withdrawals took place. Stiff delaying action was combined with use of road blocks well supported by mortar and artillery fire. This degenerated into scattered rear-guard defenses and harassing artillery fire about the 19/20 September, as the bulk of the enemy withdrew across the MOSELLE River.

A coordinated defense along the entire front was being organized by 21 September, since a junction had been made with the First Army on the right flank. The DOUBS River bridgehead was being stubbornly maintained from ST. MAURICE to VILLARS SUR ESCOT. Counterattacks and consolidated opposition indicated a new determination to hold, particularly in the region of MELAY(L1920). South of REMIREMONT resistance continued strong, while road blocks denied to us all roads to the town. Indications of the evacuation of EPINAL were to be seen in the destruction of bridges, and in movement to the East.

On the Alpine Front an increased enemy sensitivity to our advances in the areas LANSLEBOURG(H4257) was evident as he reacted with increased artillery fire and aggressive manning of positions.

3. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

a. General

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the SIXTH ARMY GROUP on the ALPINE front were generally disposed on a line MENTONE-MT S. SALVATORE-ROUTE N205-S.STEFANO*LARCHE (N3365)-AIGUILLES(H3603) - MONT GENEVRE (K4703) - MODANE (K4131)-BESSANS (H5260)-BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H5766)-VAL D'ISERE(H5275)-LES MASURES (H4792) -BOURG ST. MAURICE(74680)-ALBERTVILLE(71843)-LA GIETTAZ (U2305). No important changes occured in the disposition of enemy forces, although there are indications of possible withdrawal of the 90 Pz Gr Division.

On the Northeastern Front enemy forces were generally disposed on a line: BLAMONT(A3565)OMEDIERE(P2281)-MELISEY(K1815)-REMIREMONT(K1544)-EPINAL(V0413)-GERBEVILLER(V1089).

The enemy 19th Army, which had finally arrived in the BELFORT GAP, succeeded in establishing a firm link with the German 1st Army, where his LXVI Corps was able to join an armored force consisting of a Panzer Division (21 Pz Div) and three Panzer Brigades (111,112,113). The LXIV Corps and IV GAF Corps, constituting the central group of the 19th Army, consist of remants of 716, 189, 159, 338, 198 Infantry Divisions reorganized in battle groups of varying size and strength.

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The considerably weakened LXXXV Corps (the pivoting group around which the 19th Army executed its retreating movement) is being reinforced by various units reorganized hastily in the BELFORT area, chiefly from the debris of units and isolated troops retreating from the West.

a. ALPINE FRONT

The German LXXV Corps is responsible for the defense of the Alpine passes. It has under its command three divisions: 157th Reserve Mountain Division, which has been identified in the PETIT ST. BERNARD and the MOUNT CENIS area; the 5th Mountain Division, with elements identified at MOUNT GENEVRE and COL DU LARCHE: and the 148th Reserve Division, which, until recently, has been providing the bulk of the opposition to our troops in the NICE-CANNES sector. These units, like most German units, are seriously understrength and, all total, it is estimated that the enemy probably has no more than 25,000 to 30,000 Germans in this area, with the combat infantry effectives numbering approximately 13,000 to 14,000.

Initially, elements of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division were identified in the COL DU LARCHE and the MOUNT GENEVRE pass area, and elements of this division are still being found in the area. However, PW's interrogated recently state that the 1st Bn. of the 200th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and the 1st and 3rd Bns. of the 361st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, have recently departed from this area for GERMANY. PW's further state that the 5th Mountain Division is to relieve the 90th. AFHQ Weekly Intelligence Summary, for week ending 11 September, reports this division being on the move, but believe that its destination is for the Italian battle area, rather than GERMANY. Never the less, it appears that the division is leaving the area and will no longer be concerned with the situation in the Alpine passes.

Identification of the 80th Infantry Regiment of the 34th Infantry Division along the coast, in the MENTON area, plus PW statements, indicate that the 148th Reserve Division is in the process of being relieved by the 34th Division. This is understandable in light of the battered condition of the 148th, which has taken the brunt of the fighting in this area since August 15: furthur, the German Command in Italy is probably concerned with the steady progress being made in the MENTON area; and, fearful of the Allies' intentions, KESSELRING may be in the process of providing a stronger protection for his Northwest flank than that capable of being provided by the 148th Reserve Division.

Farther to the East are found four Italian divisions, one German division (42nd Jaeger Division), and several independent German mountain battalions. The 42nd is currently reported to be moving to the East, and elements have already been identified in the current Italian battle area. It is possible that the four German divisions remaining in the Alpine passes could be relieved by these German trained Italian divisions, or the mountain battalion thereby making these units available for more active theaters. In this connection, the present campaign being conducted by the Allies in ITALY is placing a severe strain on the resources of Marshal KESSELRING, and as progress is made in the Appenines, it becomes increasingly more likely that the enemy, in his search for reinforcements for the Gothic line, will call upon these four German divisions in the Alpine area to play a more active role.

b. NORTH EAST FRONT

The German 19th Army opposing the US 7th Army and the French 1st Army has under its command four Corps: LXVI Res Corps, LXIV Res Corps, IV GAF Corps, and the LXXXV Corps.

The LXVI Reserve Corps (LUNEVILLE-EPINAL area) is responsible for the vital area where junction with the 1st Army has been definitely established. According to last reports and identifications the LXVI Corps is being gradually reinforced and built up into a tactical unit, with the possibility of an increased amount of armor. The 21 Pz Div, 111 Pz Brig, 112 Pz Brig and 113 Pz Brig are available in the area, while the [illegible] Inf Div, considerably weakened, is being built up by the addition of B. G.

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STINGER. The attle Group OTTENBACHER, ganized from various units (192 Sec Regt, elements of the 194 and 95 Sec Regts, the 213 Inf Regt, elements of the 1708 Arty Regt and the [illegible] Engr Regt) may be considered a fairly cohesive group. Estimated available strength of the Corps is: 120 tanks and 20/25,000 men (including the armored formations.)

The LXIV Reserve Corps(REMIREMONT area) consists of remanents of 716 & 189 Inf Divs reorganized in Battle Groups (TAGLICHSBECK, ARENDS, HAFNER, BAUER, SCHWERIN, WITTE). The SCHWERIN Battle Group seems to constitute the strongest group, with various elements organized in three battle groups (ZANDER, SCHMIDT and MAHNKE). The Corps represents a patched-up group of units, reassembled on the battlefield, demoralized by retreat and sonstant change of commanding officers. Approximate strength of the Corps: 8/10,00[illegible]

The IV G. A. F. Corps(MONTBELIARD-MELISEY area) consists of remnants of 159 and 338 Inf Divs organized in battle groups (159 Di[illegible] B. G. HOELZEL, GIES, DEGENER: 339 Div: B. G. LOPAU). In addition to these units, the Corps also includes 198 Inf Div, with the 63 GAF Regt, and probably the B. G. MENKE attached. The IV GAF Corps composed chiefly of remnants of disintegrated divisions, may be considered, as its northern neighbor, a weak and gradually deteriorating unit, probably used in the retreating maneuver, for delaying action in order to slow down the pressure of the US 7th Army and French 1st Army. Approximate strength of the Corps: 5/6,000 men.

LXXXV Corps(BELFORT area) composed of the 11 Panzer Div, 1 Training Flieger Div and various elements organized in two Battle Groups (OPPEN and GREIF), bore the brunt of the fighting in the BESANCON area, constituting the hinge around which the 19th Army executed its retreating maneuver. The Corps seems to be withdrawing its units East of BELFORT. The 11 Pz Div may be pulled out altogether from the Southern sector and, after refitting, may be used in the Northern sector(junction of the 19th and 1st Armies). At present, the LXXV Corps, considerable weakened, requires considerable reshuffling and reorganization. According to French SR reports, units are being reorganized in the BELFORT area, and they are believed to be almost entirely formed of troops recovered from units withdrawing from FRANCE. It may well be that these units will be used for reinforcements of the LXXXV Corps, with possible new arrivals. Approximate strength of the Corps: 35-45 tanks, 12,000 men.

In addition to these identified component parts of the Corps, there were additional units identified on the Sixth Army Group front, which probably are directly under 19th Army. The 30 SS Division (arrived from DANZIG end of August) has not yet been engaged on the front. The Russian Volunteer Cadre Division (components unknown), which has activated the 5 Cossack Inf Regt, the 5 Kuban Regt and the East Mountain Regt, was identified in the BELFORT area. As to the components of Battle Groups BAUER and SCHRAMM, B. G. BAUER contains AA and GAF Supply Troops, while B. G. SCHRAMM has 90 Flieger Regt and 54 GAF Regt: it is reasonable to assume that they contain other units, as yet unidentified. Appr ximate strength of miscellaneous units: about 8,000 men.

4. SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION

The present increased artillery activity and generally stiffer enemy attitude may be one result of the improvement in his supply situation resulting from the heavy westward rail movements prior to 16 September. Having withdrawn close to the borders of the Reich, the enemy can make increased use of the excellent German railnet, relatively untouched by bombing and in no immediate danger of organized sabotage. Thus, the large-scale motor movement prevalent in the withdrawal from souther France have been replaced by heavy rail traffic, bringing supplies from South Germany via SINGEN and ULM, to the Rhine at NEUF BRISACH(V-7435) and KEHL (W-0597). Four new pontoon bridges across the Rhine in the NEUF BRISACH area, (Sept 13) would permit movement by motor transport into the Vosages area. In the area south of KARLSRUHE the enemy supply situation may be still further improved by rail movements now in progress, as well as by the recent large reduction in the number of fortress workers along the [illegible] of the Rhine.

5. FORTIFICATIONS

The German retreat from South France seems to have been so far ahead of schedule that the Siegfried Line was not ready for use as the troops approached. In many cases its works along the Rhine had been disarmed or damaged by flood. Work was pushed feverishly. One estimate reported 20,000 workmen, mostly Italian restoring the fortifications between FREIBURG and KARLSRUHE early in September, and even the inmates of concentration camps were employed on the work.

Second-rate troops, deficient in training but probably quite adequate for fortress work, were brought by train from the MUNICH area. By 12 September, the work had so far advanced that 10,000 fortress workers could be spared for more pressing need further north. Their departure helped ease the supply situation, grown critical due to the sudden influx of troops and the need for creating an adequate reserve for the approachaing Siegfried siege. It is probable that this reserve will not be complete before the end of September.

Meanwhile, the work of creating at least a delaying position along the Vosages and in the BELFORT GAP took shape. Passes and ridges in the Vosges were only lightly defended by machine guns and small field pieces late in August, but the natural defensive advantages of the terrain as well as the approach of bad weather makes heavy large-scale fortifications in that region seem unnecessary. Recent air photographs reveal no major work in the Vosges, bur agents report tank traps 8 meters deep being prepared in that area, and other sources indicate preparation of roadblocks.

Enemy defense organization of the BELFORT GAP, consisting of AT ditches, trenches, and pill boxes, seems to be strongest in the GIROMAGNY(K-3614-CHAMPIGNY(K-2610)-BELFORT-MONTBELIARD-SELONCOURT(A-3474)-DELLE(A-4579) area. Only 9 of the 21 French forts ringing BELFORT show major military activity, and these are generally East and South of BELFORT. The civilian population has been forced to aid in the construction, and 1500 specialist workers arrived from CONSTANCE on 14 September. Bridges in the area south of BELFORThave either been blown or prepared for demolition, indicating an enemy intention to employ the Rhine-Rhone and Haute Saone Canals as obstacles to aid the defense.

A defense line along the forward slopes of the Black Forest was under construction early in September. On 14 September 600 foreign civilian workers were removed from the LOERRACH(A-99) fortifications work, and sent to the interior of the Reich. Whether this action is due to a high level of completion of defenses in that area, or to a greater need elsewhere is not known.

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